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Conventionalism asserts that there are a variety of notions of justice, but no true one.  
The fundamental laws of any given society are said to be grounded, not on external 
considerations of natural right, but human agreements which change from society to 
society and age to age.  Justice is viewed as arbitrary and the best regime a fiction.  
Political society is an artificial, not natural, means to achieve man’s true end—
individual pleasure.  Thus the crucial problem raised by conventionalism is whether 
political society exists by convention or nature.  This dissertation examines the 
central claim of conventionalism, namely, whether human beings gather together into 
political society by convention or nature.  The former argument is given to the Roman 
Epicurean Lucretius; the latter, the Roman Academic Cicero.
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  “There is no justice at all if it is not by nature and the justice set up on a basis of 
utility is uprooted by that same utility.” 
 




























































































It is only fitting in a dissertation on duty to acknowledge those who, whether out of 
habit or choice, not only fulfilled their duty as teachers, colleagues, and parents, but 
even as friends and loved ones.  Truly, these men and women are the very best of 
individuals—those who go about their business and lives, not simply out of a sense of 
utility, but because virtue is worth pursuing for its own sake.  Never fashionable, 
never fair-weather, always thoughtful, always constant, I am honored to have worked 
with and known these men and women. 
 My sincere appreciation and love to my wife, Summer Dawn Newton and our 
recent little arrival, Wren Tullia Newton; to my parents, James and Roxann Newton; 
to my teachers, Charles E. Butterworth and Mark A. Graber; to David S. Fott, who 
very kindly offered research advice and a keen editor’s eye on my early chapters; and 
to my friend and mentor, a gentleman and a scholar to whom this essay is dedicated, 
















  v 
 




Foreword          ii 
Dedication          iii 
Acknowledgements         iv 
Table of Contents         v 
List of Abbreviations         vi 
Introduction          1 
I The Walls of the World       31 
II Ciceronian Foresight        55 
III The Nature of Convention       78 
Conclusion          99 















Ac.  Academica 
Ad Att.  Epistulae ad Atticum 
Ad. Q. Fr. Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem 
Div.  De Divinatione 
DR"  De Rerum "atura 
Fat.  De Fato 
Fin.  De Finibus 
Lac.  Lactantius, Divinarum Institutionum 
Leg.  De Legibus 
Mac.  Macrobius, Saturnalia 
"D  De "atura Deorum 
Off.  De Officiis 
Or.  De Oratore 
Rep.  De Re Publica 
Tusc.            Tusculanae Disputationes






Conventionalism asserts that there are a variety of notions of justice, but no true one.  
The fundamental laws of any given society are said to be grounded, not on external 
considerations of natural right, but human agreements which change from society to 
society and age to age.  Justice is viewed as arbitrary and the best regime a fiction.  
Political society is an artificial, not natural, means to achieve man’s true end—
individual pleasure.  Thus the crucial problem raised by conventionalism is whether 
political society exists by convention or nature.  This dissertation examines the 
central claim of conventionalism, namely, whether human beings gather together into 
political society by convention or nature.  I have attempted to seek a probable answer 
by comparing the arguments advanced on behalf of convention and nature by two of 
their most thoughtful proponents, the Roman Epicurean Lucretius, and the Roman 
Academic Cicero, respectively.  Lucretius has been chosen because his De Rerum 
"atura is the most complete and thoughtful account of classical Epicureanism which 
in turn proved to be the most successful variant of conventionalism.  In addition, 
Lucretius provides the most extant classical Epicurean exposition on political 
society.
1
  Cicero has been chosen because he is the most thoughtful opponent of 
Epicureanism; for unlike Plato or Aristotle who lived before Epicurus, Cicero lived 
                                                 
1
 D. P. Fowler, “Lucretius and Politics,” Philosophia Togata: Essays on Philosophy 
and Roman Society (Oxford, 1989), p. 129; Arnaldo Momigliano, “Epicureans in 
Revolt,” Journal of Roman Studies, 31 (1941), pp. 149-57. 
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significantly later and considered the threat posed by Epicureanism to be the 
philosophical crisis of his day.
2
  Further, Cicero and Lucretius were contemporaries.  
Cicero read Lucretius’ De Rerum "atura,
3
 may have edited it,
4
 and, it has been 
argued, composed his De "atura Deorum in reply.
5
 
This dissertation is divided into an introduction, three central chapters, and a 
conclusion.  Chapter one analyzes the argument on behalf of convention which 
depends on all human need being reduced to the corporeal pleasure of individuals 
living in solitude.  Lucretius embraced this view, but not unqualifiedly.  Throughout 
Lucretius’ De Rerum "atura, a tension may be observed between such corporeal 
reductionism and a grudging admission that there might be needs, still more 
important, exclusive to men living in political society.  Lucretius’ discussion of 
religion and the nature of political man suggest two such needs, first, the alleviation 
of a fundamental fear that the eternal is not lovable, nor the lovable eternal, and, 
second, the belief in providential gods who reward virtue and punish vice in deterring 
unjust conduct.  The reader of Lucretius’ De Rerum "atura is left with the persistent 
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 Cf. Ad Quintum Fratrem 2.9, hereafter cited as Ad Q. Fr. 
 
4
 Almost nothing is known about Lucretius.  The assertion that Cicero edited his De 
Rerum "atura was made by St. Jerome in his Chronicle under the year 94 B.C.  St. 
Jerome’s statement provides our only biographical knowledge:  “Titus Lucretius the 
poet is born.  After being driven mad when he drank a love potion, he wrote a number 
of books in between periods of insanity.  Cicero later edited them.  He killed himself 
by his own hand during his 44
th
 year of life.”  Cf. Lucretius, On the "ature of Things, 
trans. Walter Englert (Newburyport, 2003), pp. xi-xii. 
 
5
 Cf. Joseph B. Mayor, “On the Design and Execution of the Dialogue,” Cicero, De 
"atura Deorum Libri Tres, Vol. III (Cambridge, 2010), pp. x-xiii.  Originally 
published between 1880-85. 
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suspicion that man is most pleased when he is secure, not simply in bodily well-
being, but in the comfort of providence and justice.  Chapter two analyzes those needs 
of man which have nothing to do with his body, and so turns from Lucretius to 
Cicero.  Cicero, too, had highlighted the political importance of providence in his De 
"atura Deorum.  He argued that if the activities touching upon religious obligation 
owed by man for divine supervision are mere façade and pretence, they can contain 
no true devotion; if they contain no true devotion, then all sense of piety is destroyed.  
If this were to occur, political society, he maintained, would be thrown into great 
confusion and the preeminent virtue of justice would disappear.  This suggests a link 
between piety and healthy political society.  Chapter three introduces the reason for 
this link, found in Cicero’s De Legibus.  Cicero’s De Legibus argues that human 
beings require law.   It demonstrates not only why human beings require law, but how 
law naturally originates and why it is naturally obeyed.  It demonstrates that political 
society, far from being conventional, is quite natural.  Obedience to law, however, 
especially fundamental law, requires piety.  A healthy political society is one in 
which its citizens show dutiful respect to the source of the higher law in which justice 
originates.  If a citizenry loses its piety, it risks becoming corrupt.  Justice constituted 
solely on the basis of utility is undermined by that same utility.  Thus Cicero 
concludes that while better law may make for better citizens, piety is required if the 
law is to be obeyed.  Lucretius’ analysis is therefore twofold unconvincing, first, in 
considering law and thus political society mere convention, and, second, in equating 
piety to a physical malady like so much indigestion. 
  4 
 
Before turning to a more precise discussion of conventionalism, I consider 
first the most prevalent contemporary variant of conventionalism, historicism.  While 
historicism is not the focus of this dissertation, it is the form of conventionalism most 
familiar to modern readers.  Therefore I begin with it, returning afterwards to 
conventionalism proper. 
Historicism proposes that if there is any meaning to be gleamed from the 
diversity of opinions on the just and unjust, it lies in that very diversity.  Justice and 
injustice are seen to be peculiar to the opinions of a particular time, place, people, or 
individual.  There is no knowledge of justice or injustice simply.  There is only 
historical knowledge.  But historicism immediately becomes problematic.  How can 
historicism itself be exempt from contingent developments in late nineteenth- and 
early twentieth-century Europe?  How can the historian overcome his own prejudices 
to discern truth?  How can historical knowledge claim to be true knowledge? 
 One of the clearest expositions of the historicist position is to be found in R. 
G. Collingwood’s Autobiography.
6
  It is therefore worthwhile to carefully consider 
Collingwood’s Autobiography as a guide to understanding historicism.  Collingwood 
began by observing that you cannot find out what a thinker means by merely studying 
his written or spoken words; in order to discover what he meant you must also know 
the questions he had in mind which he was attempting to answer.  Each answer given 
is a highly detailed and particularized proposition to an equally detailed and 
particularized question.  Thus there is a strict correlativity between question and 
                                                 
6
 R.G. Collingwood, An Autobiography (Oxford, 2002). 
 




  Collingwood’s method of question and answer emphasizes contingent 
particularity, not generality: “[T]his principle of correlativity between question and 
answer disposes of a good deal of clap-trap.  People will speak of a savage as 
‘confronted by the eternal problem of obtaining food’.  But what really confronts him 
is the problem, quite transitory like all things human, of spearing this fish, or digging 
up this root, or finding blackberries in this wood.”
8
  Equipped with this method, 
Collingwood turns to what a given thinker intended by his answer to a proposition.  
When a thinker wrote in the distant past, if he was a good writer, he wrote for his 
contemporaries and, in particular, for those who were already asking the question to 
which he is offering an answer.  Since the thinker assumed the question common 
knowledge, it is no surprise he seldom explains what the question is he is attempting 
to answer.  Later on, after he has become a “classic” and his contemporaries are long 
dead, the question is forgotten, especially if the answer given at the time was believed 
to be the right answer.  Thus the original question can only be reconstructed 
historically.
9
  But, someone might object, let us allow for different answers to 
philosophical questions; can we not concede that they are different attempts to answer 
permanent questions?  No; this is a vulgar error, replies Collingwood, consequent on 
a kind of historical myopia which mistakes superficial similarities for eternal 
problems.
10
  Consider Plato’s Republic and Hobbes’ Leviathan.  Do they represent 
                                                 
7
 Ibid., pp. 31-2. 
 
8
 Ibid., pp. 33-3. 
 
9
 Ibid., p. 39. 
 
10
 Ibid., pp. 60-1. 
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two different theories of the same thing, namely, “what is a state?”  No; because 
Plato’s “state” is the Greek polis, and Hobbes’ state the absolutist state of the 
seventeenth century.
11
  Both the question as well as the answer given to “what is a 
state” changed over time: 
 
[T]he history of political theory is not the history of different answers given to 
one and the same question, but the history of a problem more or less 
constantly changing, whose solution was changing with it.  The ‘form of the 
polis’ is not, as Plato seems to have thought, the one and only ideal of human 
society possible to intelligent men.  It is not something eternally laid up in 
heaven and envisaged, as the goal of their efforts by all good statesmen of 
whatever age and country.  It was the ideal of human society as that ideal was 
conceived by the Greeks at Plato’s own time.  By the time of Hobbes, people 
changed their minds not only about what was possible in the way of social 
organization, but about what was desirable.  Their ideals were different.  And 
consequently the political philosophers whose business it was to give a 
reasoned statement of those ideals had a different task before them; one 





 We will remember Collingwood’s remark above that writers always write for 
their contemporaries.  Now we are told that even philosophers, whose business it is to 
transcend the merely conventional, are essentially nothing more than articulate 
mouthpieces working out answers to the questions of their time and people.  Both 
                                                 
11
 Ibid., p. 61-2. 
 
12
 Ibid., pp. 62-3.  Cf. also R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford, 1993), p. 
229: “The Republic of Plato is an account, not of the unchanging ideal of political 
life, but of the Greek ideal as Plato received it and re-interpreted it.  The Ethics of 
Aristotle describes not an eternal morality but the morality of the Greek gentleman.  
Hobbes’ Leviathan expounds the political ideas of seventeenth-century absolutism in 
their English form.  Kant’s ethical theories express the moral convictions of German 
pietism; his Critique of Pure Reason analyses the conceptions and principles of 
Newtonian science, in their relation to the philosophical problem of the day. . . . They 
are expounding the positions reached by the human mind in its historical development 
down to their own time.” 
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Plato and Hobbes, says Collingwood, asked different questions and supplied different 
answers.  He does not consider the possibility that Plato’s Republic and Hobbes’ 
Leviathan actually addressed the same problem, specifically, the problem of the best 
commonwealth or political society.  In order to understand why Collingwood would 
advocate this position, we must turn to his conception of metaphysics.  
 Collingwood understands by “metaphysics” an attempt to discover what a 
given people at a given time believed about the world’s general nature.  Such beliefs 
expose the presuppositions of their physics, that is, their inquiries into the workings 
of the whole.  The bedrock of a given people’s presuppositions about the whole is 
called by Collingwood their “absolute presuppositions”—presuppositions from which 
there can be no escape.  When taken with the corresponding absolute presuppositions 
of other peoples at other times, the historian may follow the historical process by 
which one set of presuppositions gradually turns into another.  It is for this reason that 
Collingwood and thus historicism can maintain the impossibility of permanent 
philosophical questions.  Philosophers work out answers to questions predetermined 
by their people’s absolute presuppositions; as the historical process rolls along and 
the absolute presuppositions change, so too do the questions and therefore the 
answers.  There are no permanent problems.
13
  It is also for this reason that, for 
Collingwood, all philosophical questions resolve themselves into historical questions.  
If there were a permanent problem P, we could ask what a given thinker thought 
about P and evaluate the merits of his answer.  But problem P, says Collingwood, is 
                                                 
13
 Collingwood, An Autobiography, pp. 65-7.  Cf. also R. G. Collingwood, The Idea 
of "ature (Oxford, 1945), pp. 1-3. 
 
  8 
 
never a permanent problem, but in reality one of a number of transitory problems P1, 
P2, P3, whose individual peculiarities are blurred by the historical nearsightedness of 
the person who lumps them together under the one name P.
14
  “For me, then, there 
were not two separate sets of questions to be asked, one historical and one 
philosophical, about a given passage in a given philosophical author.  There was one 
set only, the historical.”
15
  Collingwood was never able to offer a satisfactory answer 
as to whether this conclusion itself was a permanent answer or a merely historical 
one.  If the former, he would have had to concede the possibility of transcending 
history; if the latter, the impossibility of all knowledge, including historical 
knowledge.  There is no middle ground. 
 It is very revealing that there is no discussion to be found in Collingwood’s 
Autobiography, The Idea of History, or The Idea of "ature of conventionalism.
16
  
Conventionalism similarly recognized the diversity of opinions on the just and unjust; 
however, unlike historicism, it did not conclude with the contradiction of the 
relativity of all opinion except historical opinion.  Conventionalism recognized nature 
as a standard above mere human opinion.  What was right was said to be what was 
right by nature, specifically, to seek one’s own individual pleasure.  Again, a more 
precise discussion of conventionalism will be given in the sequel.  Here it is helpful to 
                                                 
14
 Collingwood, An Autobiography, pp. 68-9. 
 
15
 Ibid., p. 72. 
 
16
 The only hint of whether Collingwood was even aware of the argument from 
convention is a few references made on the Greek distinction between episteme and 
doxa, knowledge and opinion, and phusis and techne, nature and artifice.  Cf. 
Collingwood, The Idea of History, pp. 20, 28. 
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consider that when turning to classical thought, Collingwood’s method of question 
and answer and his doctrine of absolute presuppositions render him oblivious to this 
important precursor to historicism, found at the center of all classical political 
philosophy.  In its place Collingwood substitutes a good deal of discussion on “the 
Greek mind.”  The Greek mind, states Collingwood, was dominated by two 
characteristics: humanism and substantialism.  Regarding the former, Collingwood 
maintains that the ancients believed every man capable of reason and therefore able to 
control his own fate.  “Now the idea that every agent is wholly and directly 
responsible for everything that he does is a naïve idea which takes no account of 
certain important regions in moral experience,” namely, “there is no getting away 
from the fact that men’s characters are formed by their actions and experiences.”
17
  In 
other words: man is molded by his mores, among other contingent circumstances.  
However, what Collingwood failed to consider is that the ancients were only too 
aware of this fact and addressed it especially in their discussions of civic education.  
This will be made very clear in the third chapter of this dissertation.  Regarding the 
second attribute yoked to “the Greek mind,” substantialism, the “chief defect” of 
classical thought, Collingwood understands, “a theory of knowledge according to 
which only what is unchanging is knowable.”
18
  If all philosophical questions have 
resolved themselves into historical questions, and if historical knowledge is 
knowledge only of an ever-changing historical process, it goes without saying that 
any attempt at knowledge of permanent human characteristics and problems is a 
                                                 
17
 Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 41. 
 
18
 Ibid., p. 42. 
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fruitless endeavor.  But, again, Collingwood failed to consider that for many classical 
thinkers, philosophy was first and foremost an attempt to replace conventional 
opinions of the whole with probable knowledge of the whole, an approach trumpeted 
especially by the successors of Plato, the Academic skeptics.  And these classical 
thinkers would have begged the question, if all knowledge derives from absolute 
presuppositions, how can historical knowledge itself be exempt from being an 
absolute presupposition? 
 It is interesting to observe that in his Autobiography, Collingwood is 
unwilling to apply historicist principles to what classical political philosophy 
considered a permanent problem in civic education, namely, the concern of the 
individual for his own well-being at the expense of the common good.  In his chapter, 
“The Decay of Realism,” Collingwood laments that the methods and principles of the 
“realists,” the predecessors of contemporary Anglo-American analytic philosophy, 
had a destructive affect on the civic education of the young men and women attending 
Oxford and Cambridge in the early twentieth-century.  He accuses the “realists” of 
destroying political theory, “by denying the conception of the common good, the 




The pupils, whether or not they expected a philosophy that should give 
them…ideals to live for and principles to live by, did not get it; and were told 
no philosopher (except a bogus philosopher) would even try to give it.  The 
inference which any pupil could draw for himself was that for guidance in the 
problems of life, since one must not seek it from thinkers or from thinking, 
from ideals or from principles, one must look to people who were not thinkers 
(but fools), to processes that were not thinking (but passions), to aims that 
                                                 
19
 Collingwood, An Autobiography, p. 49. 
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were not ideals (but caprices), and to rules that were not principles (but rules 
of expediency).  If the realists had wanted to train up a generation of 
Englishmen and Englishwomen expressly as the potential dupes of every 
adventurer in morals and politics, commerce and religion, who should appeal 
to their emotions and promise them private gains which he neither could 






What Collingwood in a fit of moral indignation hit upon is a permanent 
problem posed to civic educators.  If people are brought up to look only to their own 
self-interest, being told there is nothing else, they will pursue it at the expense of what 
they perceive to be a non-existent common good.  But as Collingwood himself points 
out, the common good is necessary for political life.  As will be demonstrated, this 
argument on behalf of individual utility is precisely the challenge posed by 
conventionalism.  But Collingwood and historicism can offer no standard to evaluate 
it outside of “history” as a guide because “nature” is seen to be nothing more than a 
series of absolute presuppositions.  What possible basis is there for “thinking,” 
“ideals,” or “principles” when all thinking is, in the final analysis, entirely time-
bound and thus also all ideals and principles?  Does not historicism effectively render 
them passions, caprices, and expediencies?  In sum, historicism is a modern variant of 
conventionalism in that in shares the conventionalist insight on the plurality of 
opinion on the just and unjust; it differs in that while conventionalism can offer nature 
as a standard, historicism can offer only the history of opinion. 
 
 
                                                 
20
 Ibid., pp. 48-9. 




Conventionalism, to repeat, asserts that there are a variety of notions of justice, but no 
true one.  The fundamental laws of any given society are said to be grounded, not on 
external considerations of natural right, but human agreements which change from 
society to society and age to age.  Justice is viewed as arbitrary and the best regime a 
fiction.  Political society is an artificial, not natural, means to achieve man’s true 
end—individual pleasure.  Thus the crucial problem raised by conventionalism is 
whether political society exists by nature or convention. 
 This problem was most clearly recognized in classical political philosophy.  In 
the third book of Cicero’s De Re Publica, the argument on behalf of conventionalism 
is given to a young Academic skeptic, Lucius Furius Philus.  The argument is 
described as “the defense of wickedness” or the unjust argument.
21
  Philus argues 
that, first, justice is conventional rather than natural, and, second, those who practice 
justice are fools.  If justice were natural rather than conventional it would be 
manifestly known to all men, at all times, everywhere, in the same way, just as hot 
and cold, bitter and sweet.  But in point of fact notions of justice change.
22
  Who does 
not see, insists Philus, that in Egypt, the oldest and most uncorrupted of races, a bull 
is considered a god and animals of all sorts have likewise been so consecrated?  Or 
how in Greece the gods have been sanctified as human statues in temples?  Or how 
                                                 
21
 Cicero, On the Commonwealth and On the Laws, edited by James E. G. Zetzel 
(Cambridge, 1999), 3.8.  Hereafter cited as Rep. after the Latin title, De Re Publica. 
 
22
 Rep. 3.13. 
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the Taurians, Gauls, and Carthaginians have thought it quite pious to sacrifice human 
beings to the immortal gods?  Do not we ourselves, supposedly the most just of 
peoples, prohibit the tribes on the other side of the Alps from growing olives and 
vines, so that our own olive groves and vineyards may be more valuable?  In so 
doing, we certainly act prudently, but hardly justly.  The former is wise but wicked, 




If I wished to list the types of law, institutions, customs, and behaviors not 
only in the varieties among the races of the world but in one city, even in this 
one,
24
 I would show that they were changed a thousand times, so that our 
friend Manilius here, the interpreter of the law, would recognize one set of 
laws now concerning legacies and inheritances of women, but when he was a 
young man used to recognize something quite different before the passage of 
the Voconian Law.
25
  And that law itself, which was passed in the interest of 






 Justice, argues Philus, is peculiar from society to society, and even in the same 
society from age to age.  It is the product of human society.  Moreover, justice is not 
desired for its own sake, but always in the interest or utility of some one or few.  
There is no common good.  Laws are observed because of punishments, not justice.
27
  
                                                 
23
 Rep. 3.14-16. 
 
24
 I.e., Rome. 
 
25
 The Voconian Law passed in 169 BC prohibited wealthy men from naming women 
as heirs.  Women could, however, be left a certain percentage of the estate.  Cf. 
Zetzel, On the Commonwealth and On the Laws, p. 65 n.15. 
 
26
 Rep. 3.17. 
 
27
 Rep. 3.18.  Cf. 3.20. 
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And yet, someone might object, it is all well and good to declare justice the interest or 
utility of a certain few, long after civil society has been established, but for what 
reason did men first gather together?  Why for the very same reason, replies Philus.  
Weakness caused individuals living in solitude to seek their own self-preservation in 




 Philus’ second argument is a direct consequence of his first.  He reasons that 
because justice is conventional rather than natural, it is wise to cause injury to others 
under the guise of justice.  It is wise to seem just, but practice injustice.  All 
successful imperial powers have acted in this manner.  Wisdom counsels us to 
increase our resources, enlarge our wealth, extend our boundaries, rule over as many 
peoples as possible, in short, “to enjoy pleasures, to be powerful, to rule, to be a 
lord.”
29
  Justice instructs us to spare everyone, look after the interests of the human 
race, render to each his own, and respect the possessions of another.  Who does not 
see which to choose?  “What will be the result if you obey wisdom?  Wealth, power, 
resources, offices, commands, rule whether by individuals or nations.”
30
  Who does 
not see that Rome, growing from a tiny nation to master of the entire world, acted out 
of wisdom rather than justice?  If we should really desire to be just, we would have to 
return the property which we took from others, and go back to living in huts, 
                                                 
28
 Rep. 3.23. 
 
29
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languishing in want and wretchedness.  What nation would do this?
31
  And even if we 
should act justly, in so weakening our own power, we risk enslavement by another 
nation, acting out of the very same wisdom we abandoned.  What nation would risk 
this?  No nation may reasonably be expected to follow a course which leads to their 
impoverishment or enslavement.
32
  The individual or nation must appear just, but 
practice injustice.  All the benefits stemming from the appearance of justice will be 
had while all the misfortunes from too strictly practicing it will be avoided.  To 
appear just but practice injustice—that is human nature.  Man always acts out of 
considerations of utility. 
 The alternative to conventionalism may also be found in Cicero’s De Re 
Publica.  There his character Scipio states that a commonwealth is, “the concern of a 
people,” but that a people is not simply any group of men assembled in any way, but 
those who share a sense of justice and the common good.  Without these there can be 
no such union.  Nor does the commonwealth come about because of human 
weakness, but owing to a social human nature.  Man by nature shuns solitude and 
seeks society.  “The first cause of [man’s] assembly is not so much weakness as a 
kind of natural herding together of men: this species is not prone to wandering alone 
but it is so created that not even in an abundance of everything <do men wish to live a 
solitary existence>.”
33
  Thus, says Scipio, the commonwealth is not conventional, but 
                                                 
31
 Cf. Lactantius, Divinarum Institutionum 5.16.4. 
 
32
 Rep. 3.27-8.  Cf. James E. Holton, “Marcus Tullius Cicero,” History of Political 
Philosophy, edited by Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago, 1987), p. 169. 
 
33
 Rep. 1.39.  The last part of the sentence is lost along with one leaf in the 
manuscript.  Cf. De Finibus 2.59 as well as Lac., Inst. 6.10.18 where Lactantius 
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natural.  This dissertation as a whole attempts to demonstrate that the argument of 
Scipio, in which political society is said to exist by nature, is much more reasonable 




It remains in this introduction to demonstrate, first, why conventionalism warrants the 
attention of the reader, next, how prior scholars have generally read the authors in 
question, and, finally, offer a few comments on text editions.  To take up the first 
question, if justice is truly arbitrary and the best regime truly a fiction, then it is then 
quite reasonable to constitute a society which aims at man’s true end, pleasure, while 
securing it by means of his true bearing, passion.  The consequences of this argument 
would be most fully realized and developed in the seventeenth century by Thomas 
Hobbes whose Leviathan proved a blueprint for much of modernity.  Hobbes would 
reduce the entire human condition to matter in motion, specifically, the motions of 
appetite and aversion.
34
  The only absolute motion, the motion according to nature, 
was said to be the aversion to self-annihilation, death.
35
  All other considerations were 
conventional: 
                                                                                                                                           
summarizes this section of De Republica: “Others have thought these ideas as insane 
as they in fact are and have said that it was not being mauled by wild animals that 
brought men together, but human nature itself, and that they herded together because 
the nature of humans shuns solitude and seeks community and society.” 
 
34
 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, edited by Richard Tuck (Oxford, 2010), chap. 6. 
 
35
 Hobbes, Leviathan chap. 14. 
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But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it, which 
he for his part calleth Good: And the object of his Hate, and Aversion, Evill; 
And of his Contempt, Vile and Inconsiderable.  For these words of Good, 
Evill, and Contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth 
them: There being nothing simply and absolute so; nor any common Rule of 
Good and Evill, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves, but 
from the Person of the man (where there is no Common-wealth;) or, (in a 
Common-wealth,) from the Person that representeth it; or from an Arbitrator 
or Judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his 





 Men, said Hobbes, like Philus before him, gather together out of weakness.  
The original position of man was one of solitude, continual fear, and insecurity; man 
sought political society to escape such wretched circumstances.  Since the original 
position was one of continual war in which everyone could defend themselves by any 
means necessary, there is no natural justice.  In the war of all against all, nothing can 
be unjust.  Justice and injustice arise only after the establishment of a particular 
commonwealth.  Where there is no common power, there is no law; where there is no 
law, there is no justice.  In short, justice and injustice cannot be reduced to properties 
of matter which are the same for all men, everywhere, at all times; rather, they are the 
conventions of men living in artificial society, not natural solitude.
37
  What is to be 
                                                 
36
 Hobbes, Leviathan chap. 6. 
 
37
 Hobbes, Leviathan chap. 13: “To this warre of every man against every man, this 
also is consequent; that nothing can be Unjust.  The notions of Right and Wrong, 
Justice and Injustice have there no place.  Where there is no common Power, there is 
no Law: where no Law, no Injustice.  Force, and Fraud, are in warre the two Cardinal 
vertues.  Justice, and Injustice are none of the Faculties neither of the Body, nor 
Mind.  If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as 
his Senses, and Passions.  They are Qualities, that relate to men in Society, not in 
Solitude.” 
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done?  Is it not reasonable to constitute a civil society founded on man’s desire for 
security and hope for commodious living, that is, pleasure, and police it by means of 
that very desire for security and commodious living, namely, passion?
38
  Utility must 
be made to counteract utility—or as Madison said: “Ambition must be made to 
counteract ambition.”
39
  To be sure, the pleasures which individuals engage in must 
be of the most trivial sort, material well-being and harmless attachments, and their 
pursuits must not be allowed to weaken the commonwealth by seeking a good higher 
than that of the peaceable society.
40
  But is this not reasonable in the face of the 
alternative?
41
  One need only mention in passing that John Locke would sweeten 
Hobbes’ modern political hedonism by emphasizing the hedonism portion more than 
the political in declaring commodious living to be as essential to man as dear life.
42
  
                                                 
38
 Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan chap. 13: “The Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare 
of Death; Desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope 
by their Industry to obtain them.  And Reason suggesteth convenient Articles of 
Peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement.” 
 
39
 James Madison, Federalist Paper 51, American State Papers (Chicago, 1993). 
 
40
 Cf. esp. Hobbes, Leviathan chaps. 22 and 29. 
 
41
 Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan chap. 13: “Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of 
Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, 
wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own 
invention shall furnish them withall.  In such condition, there is no place for Industry; 
because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no 
Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious 
Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; 
no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no 
Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And 
the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.” 
 
42
 Cf. John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, Two Treatises of 
Government, edited by Peter Laslett (Cambridge, 2008), esp. chap. 5. 
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Would not the most pressing questions thereafter concern how to fairly distribute the 
spoils in this scramble for individual pleasure?  Would not the name for such a 
distribution mutantis mutandis be called “justice”?  Would not the new reorientation 




It would be to put the cart before the horse to discuss how prior scholars have read 
Lucretius and Cicero without having first introduced Lucretius and Cicero; however, 
it is helpful to address here certain common misconceptions held by scholars about 
both authors which directly relate to and distinguish this dissertation.  A common 
misunderstanding made with respect to Lucretius is what sort of audience he intended 
to reach with his lengthy poem.  It is held because of a second and ultimately more 
important misunderstanding, how to interpret Lucretius’ teaching of religion. 
The various misconceptions of what sort of audience Lucretius wrote for all 
share one common trait: they portray Lucretius in a democratic light.  Examples 
include but are not limited to presenting Lucretius as a sage engaging in an 
enlightening exchange between autonomous equals, a position taken by Lydia 
Lenaghan and C. Joachim Classen;
43
 an Enlightenment liberator of mankind from 
                                                 
43
 Cf. Lydia Lenaghan, “Lucretius 1.921-50,” Transactions and Proceedings of the 
American Philological Association, 98 (1967), p. 27 and C. Joachim Classen, “Poetry 
and Rhetoric in Lucretius,” Transactions and Proceedings of the American 
Philological Association, 99 (1968), pp. 77-118. 
 
  20 
 
superstition, advanced by Herbert M. Howe;
44
 an Enlightenment rationalist wishing to 
test religious opinion in a marketplace of ideas, asserted by Lawrence A. Springer;
45
 
or a proto-Carl Sagan redirecting man’s religious piety towards the raw, “workings of 
atoms, void, and swerve,” contended by Kirk Summers.
46
  Against these arguments 
that Lucretius intended to reach a broad audience are a second group scholars who 
likewise all share one common trait: they present Lucretius as writing for a 
comparatively few.  This thesis can either be directly asserted, owing to a suspicion 
that Lucretius’ teaching on religion cannot be embraced by many, as was first argued 
by Leo Strauss and afterwards by those following in his footsteps, such as James H. 
Nichols and John Colman;
47
 or it can be indirectly observed in how Lucretius 
rhetorically organized his poem, presenting his unpleasant teachings only impartially 
or gradually over time in order to assuage the impact on commonly held religious 
sentiments, as noted by Edward M. Bradley and D. P. Fowler.
48
 
                                                 
44




 Lawrence A. Springer, “The Role of Religio, Solvo and Ratio in Lucretius,” The 
Classical World, 71 (1971), pp. 55-61. 
 
46
 Kirk Summers, “Lucretius and the Epicurean Tradition of Piety,” Classical 
Philology, 90 (1995), p. 57. 
 
47
 Leo Strauss, “Notes on Lucretius,” Liberalism, Ancient and Modern (Chicago, 
1968), pp. 83-5; James Nichols, Epicurean Political Philosophy: The De rerum natura 
of Lucretius, (London, 1976), pp. 44, 159-60; John Colman, “Lucretius on Religion,” 
Perspectives on Political Science, 38 (2009), p. 229. 
 
48
 Cf. Edward M. Bradley, “Lucretius and the Irrational,” The Classical Journal, 67 
(1972), p. 319; Fowler, “Lucretius and Politics,” p. 148.  Cf. also Colman, “Lucretius 
on Religion,” p. 229; Nichols, Epicurean Political Philosophy, pp. 32-41; Leo 
Strauss, "atural Right and History, (Chicago, 1953), p. 113, n. 45; “Notes on 
Lucretius,” pp. 83-5. 
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Lucretius states at the beginning of his poem that he wishes to rid men of 
religious fear.  The Latin word for religion is religio.  Much of the scholarship on 
Lucretius to date has not approached him as a political philosopher and so did not 
approach religio in De Rerum "atura as a political concept.  Two good examples of 
the traditional understanding of religio may be found in Howe and Springer.  Howe 
attempts to locate Lucretius’ emphasis on religion in his personality and historical 
situation.
49
  He turns to other authors, not always contemporary, in order to determine 
how religio was used generally and thus by Lucretius particularly.  This historical 
method allows him to make a distinction, on the one hand, between religio, or an 
orderly scheme of beliefs and practices, either codified in the ius divinum or by the 
application of rational explanation, and, on the other, superstitio, or irrational fear of 
the unknown.  Having made this distinction, Howe concludes that Lucretius does not 
attack codified or rational religion, only irrational superstition.  Lucretius thus 
assumes the air of a rational deist wishing to rid men of irrational superstition.  The 
most immediate problem with this claim is that Lucretius himself never once uses the 
word superstitio, a problem which Howe unsuccessfully attempts to dispel.
50
   By 
contrast, Springer endeavors to sled light on Lucretius’ fourteen usages of the word 
religio by interpreting them in light of his use of the words solveo and ratio, release 
and reason, respectively.   However, this philological method results in Springer 
                                                 
49
 Cf. Howe, “Religio of Lucretius,” p. 329: “This obsession [with religion], which 
marks Lucretius off from his Epicurean forerunners, Greek or Roman, is not inherent 




 Ibid., pp. 329-30. 
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anachronistically turning Lucretius into someone resembling John Stuart Mills.
51
  Of 
the two, the greater error is Howe’s because of the greater problems involved in 
trying to locate a thinker’s teachings solely within his historicity.  How Lucretius 
understood religion and how that understanding in turn determined his intended 
audience, his political teaching, and, ultimately, the tension within his poem and thus 
within conventionalism, is the subject of the first chapter.
52
 
While Lucretius has found a relatively sympathetic and interested modern 
audience,
53
 Cicero has found neither.  The reason is largely a nineteenth-century one 
and may be summed up in a quote from Joseph B. Mayor from his influential three-
volume edition of De "atura Deorum (1880-85): 
 
Cicero is a man of extraordinary ability cultivated to the highest pitch by an 
excellent education, with the widest tastes and sympathies, and a mind open, 
as that of few Romans has been, to all impressions of beauty and sublimity.  
But, considered as a philosopher, he has the misfortune to be at the same time 
a lawyer, an orator and a man of the world: in his philosophical treatises we 
are too often conscious of the author holding a brief, appealing to the 
populace, writing against time and amidst countless distractions, far removed 
from the whole-hearted concentration of a Plato or a Lucretius.
54
 
                                                 
51
 Cf. Springer, “The Role of Religio,” p. 61: “I suggest that religio in Lucretius does 
not pertain solely to religion in the narrow sense but rather in the broader sense to any 
ideology that constrains man in his quest for truth.  All Lucretius is pleading for is 
that man have an open mind, unhampered by any religious, social, or political 
ideology.  Lucretius is saying something that may have been too advanced for his 
day, that any idea that cannot stand the test of reason, no matter how time-honored, 
must be discarded.” 
 
52
 Other scholarship not mentioned here on Lucretius and these themes is addressed 
over the course of chapter one. 
 
53
 Cf. most recently e.g., Stephen Greenblatt, The Swerve: How the World Became 
Modern (New York, 2011). 
 
54
 Mayor, “On the Design and Execution of the Dialogue,” p. xiv. 




This misconception conceives of Cicero as a humane man, but a mediocre 
philosopher; his works are interesting for what they may tell us about contemporary 
Roman values, but in themselves are derivative and eclectic; the most important 
method for understanding them is source-criticism (Quellenforschung),
55
 but on their 
own do not merit much attention as original philosophical works.  In short, Cicero 
was a statesman first, an amateur philosopher second.  This misconception has 
continued to hold sway to the present day, despite strong evidence to the contrary.
56
  
Walter Nicgorksi made great advances against the claim that Cicero was a compiler 
and not a thinker by pointing to the fact that this nineteenth century prejudice is 
supported by a single ambiguous reference in a letter written by Cicero;
57
 countless 
other references in which Cicero took seriously his engagement with philosophy 
disprove it.
58
  He further pointed out that to employ the ideas of others by no means 
makes one’s own work derivative.
59
  Since Nicgorski’s article, others have followed 
suit in arguing against the Quellenforschung approach to understanding Cicero: 
                                                 
55
 Cf. e.g., Ibid., “Sources of Book I,” Vol. 1, pp. xlii-liv; “Sources of Book II,” Vol. 
2, pp. xvi-xxiii; “On the Sources of Book III,” Vol. 3, pp. lx-lxx. 
 
56
 Cf. e.g. Malcolm Schofield, “Cicero For and Against Divination,” Journal of 
Roman Studies, 76 (1986), pp. 47-65. 
57
 Ad Atticus 12.52.3, hereafter cited as Ad Att. 
 
58
 Walter Nicgorski, “Cicero and the Rebirth of Political Philosophy,” Political 
Science Reviewer, 8 (1978), p. 73. 
 
59
 Ibid., p. 75: “If Cicero sorted through and chose among the teachings of the 
philosophical schools, what standards or principles of choice has he employed?  If 
Cicero developed the thought of his acknowledged greatest teachers, Plato and 
Aristotle, what were the additions and subtractions and the principles governing 
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It is, of course, legitimate to ask what Cicero’s sources were.  But the old 
approach was characterized, broadly speaking, not just by an extreme 
confidence in what today should count as very speculative methods, but also 
by the belief in the superiority of virtually all Greek over Roman authors.  
Scholars often simply assumed, even if there was no evidence to suggest it, 
that Cicero slavishly copied Greek sources, and the reconstruction of those 





 Variations on the theme of Cicero as amateur philosopher include but are not 
limited to seeing Cicero as one whose greatness resides, not in originality, but in 
giving to the Latin tongue a philosophical vocabulary, and to the Roman people some 
breadth of perspective, as argued by Elizabeth Rawson;
61
 or as a thoughtful man who, 
despite Academic overtures of skepticism, ultimately sided with eclectic Stoicism, as 
advanced by John Glucker and Leonardo Taran;
62
 or as one who, despite 
acknowledging evidence to the contrary, simply chose à la Pascal to embrace faith in 
                                                                                                                                           
them?  Similarly, if Cicero bends Stoicism back in the direction of Plato, what 
governed this degree of the curvature?  If Cicero fused Greek and Roman things, 
what has determined the nature of the synthesis?” 
 
60




 Elizabeth Rawson, Cicero: A Portrait (Plymouth, 1975), p. 3, 209. 
 
62
 John Glucker, “Cicero’s Philosophical Affiliations,” The Question of 
“Eclecticism”: Studies in Later Greek Philosophy, edited by J. M. Dillon and A. A. 
Long (Berkeley and Los Angles, 1988), pp. 34-69; Glucker, “Cicero’s Philosophical 
Affiliations Again,” Liverpool Classical Monthly, 17 (1992), pp. 134-38; Leonardo 
Taran, “Cicero’s Attitude Towards Stoicism and Skepticism in the De natura 
deorum,” Florilegium Columbianum: Essays in Honor of Paul Oskar Kristeller (New 
York, 1987), pp. 1-22. 
 
  25 
 
revelation, as claimed by Joseph G. DePhilipo.
63
  And still others simply admit to 




 Opposite these arguments are a second group of scholars who contend that 
Cicero was a proponent of the philosophic life generally and sympathized with 
Academic skepticism particularly, such as James E. Holtan, John Valdimir Price, and 
Thomas G. West.
65
  They note that Cicero set for himself the principle task of 
introducing, not a given philosophic school, but philosophy itself into Rome.  This 
was no easy task.  Philosophy or the speculative life is regarded with suspicion and 
dislike by the majority of men, to say nothing of the practical Romans.  Compounding 
this obstacle was the fact that philosophy was viewed by the Romans as being 
foreign, Greek.  Thus Holtan comments: “The necessity for Cicero to tread lightly on 
Roman sensibilities and to supply a convincing justification for the existence of 
philosophy in Rome cannot be ignored if one hopes to appreciate the degree of 
circumspection with which he felt compelled to approach this task.”
66
  Throughout 
his writings Cicero aligns himself with the Academic skeptics, a school whose origins 
                                                 
63
 Joseph D. DeFilipo, “Cicero vs. Cotta in De natura deorum,” Ancient Philosophy, 
20 (2000), pp. 178-82. 
 
64
 Arthur Stanley Pease, “The Conclusion of Cicero’s De Natura Deorum,” 




 Cf. Holton, “Marcus Tullius Cicero,” pp. 156-57; John Valdimir Price, “Sceptics in 
Cicero and Hume,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 25 (1964), p. 97-106; Thomas G. 
West, “Cicero’s Teaching on Natural Law,” St. John’s Review, 32 (1981), p. 78. 
 
66
 Holton, “Marcus Tullius Cicero,” p. 156. 
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lay in Plato.  Absolute knowledge is considered unobtainable; what can be known is 
what is more or less probable.  Such skepticism may be theoretically tenable but 
politically disastrous when taken to its logical extreme and applied to the customary 
ways of any given political society.
67
  If skepticism or philosophy is fundamentally at 
odds with political society, the philosopher must begin with the needs of political 
society—begin from the perspective of the citizen.
68
  And it is from this perspective 
that we too may better understand Cicero’s use of the dialogue form, as well as his 
eclectic Stoicism, as argued by Mary Beard, Philip Levine, Arnaldo Momigliano, 
Walter Nicgorski, and Thomas Pangle.
69
  Cicero’s philosophical affiliations, his 
                                                 
67
 Ibid.: “The thought, for example, that the commonly accepted standard of what is 
just and unjust lacks, and must always, lack, a fully rational or defensible basis may 
not unduly disturb the theoretician.  It may, however, if clearly impressed upon the 
mind of the populace, so shake popular confidence in the validity of such a standard 
that faithful adherence to it, or to any standard resting on such a tenuous and 
fundamentally arbitrary base, appears foolish.  Such an understanding may lead to a 
widespread questioning of the truth even of those principles which are perhaps 
essential to the existence of the political order, e.g., that the common good should be 
preferred by the citizens to their private good.” 
 
68
 Ibid.: “The philosopher, if this is true, must be guided by some understanding of the 
needs of the city and of the practical consequences of his teachings.  He must not risk 
the chaos that might follow a systematic and ruthless public examination of the 
principles underlying and guiding a particular order, even an order which strikes him 
as radically defective, without having given some thought to the alternatives.  A 
defective government, a government which falls far short of the best, may be better 
than no government at all.  The philosopher must begin, then, with an understanding 
of what is possible as well as what is desirable, and direct his efforts, in turn, to the 
improvement of the health of a given political order, rather than to its destruction.” 
 
69
 Mary Beard, “Cicero and Divination: The Formation of a Latin Discourse,” The 
Journal of Roman Studies, 76 (1986), pp. 40-5; Philip Levine, “The Original Design 
and the Publication of the De Natura Deorum,” Harvard Studies in Classical 
Philology, 62 (1957), pp. 7-36; Levine, “Cicero and the Literary Dialogue,” The 
Classical Journal, 53 (1958), pp. 146-51; Arnaldo Momigliano, “The Theological 
Efforts of the Roman Upper Classes in the First Century BC,” Classical Philology, 79 
(1984), pp. 199-211; Walter Nicgorski, “Cicero’s Paradoxes and His Idea of Unity,” 
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means of introducing philosophy into Rome, and above all his adherence to the 
perspective of the citizen—and what this may illustrate about the deficiencies of 






Interested readers wishing to directly consult the works of concern in this dissertation 
may want to consider a few remarks on text editions.  With respect to Lucretius’ De 
Rerum "atura, the best English edition available is that of Walter Englert.
71
  It is 
attentive to Lucretius’ word choice and verse, contains a useful introduction, outline 
to the poem, and footnotes.  The bibliography, however, is a bit incomplete with such 
authors as Leo Strauss and James Nichols noticeably absent.  The standard Latin 
edition is still that of Cyril Bailey.
72
   However, like all editions in the Oxford 
Classical Texts series, it contains only the Latin text with critical annotations at the 
bottom of each page.  Those in need of an introduction to the often difficult syntax, 
grammar, and stylistics of Lucretius should begin with P. Michael Brown’s excellent 
                                                                                                                                           
Political Theory, 12 (1984), pp. 559-60; Thomas L. Pangle, “Socratic 
Cosmopolitanism: Cicero’s Critique and Transformation of the Stoic Ideal,” 
Canadian Journal of Political Science, 31 (1998), pp. 235-62.  Cf. also Holtan, 




 Other scholarship not mentioned here on Cicero and these themes will be addressed 
over the course of chapters two and three. 
 
71
 Lucretius, On the "ature of Things, trans. Walter Englert (Newburyport, 2003). 
 
72
 Lucretius, De Rerum "atura, edited by Cyril Bailey (Oxford: 1974). 
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edition of the first book of De Rerum "atura.
73
  For a comprehensive guide to the 
stylistics or historical context of the entire poem, the reader should consult William 
Ellery Leonard and Stanley Barney Smith’s lengthy and erudite edition.
74
  A helpful 
general introduction is provided by Leonard, and an equally useful introduction to the 
commentary by Smith.  The former contains information on the man, the poet, and 
the times; the latter, the text, and Lucretius’ diction and style.  The running 
commentary throughout the six books is extensive, and the book as a whole an 
excellent resource.  The only thing missing is sufficient attention to Lucretius as a 
political philosopher, but no edition of De Rerum "atura that I know of does this. 
 With respect to Cicero’s De "atura Deorum, the best English edition is that of 
P. G. Walsh.
75
  It is attentive to Cicero’s word choice, contains a summary of the text 
at the front of the book, and often very helpful explanatory notes at the back.  The 
introduction is useful, the bibliography incomplete.  Many respected scholars who 
have written on De "atura Deorum or Cicero generally are absent such as Philip 
Levine, Arnaldo Momigliano, and, especially, Walter Nicgorski.  It is understood that 
such a bibliography is select; however, like Englert above, Walsh’s choices do not 
seem to cover all the perspectives.  It was only in the early nineteen-nineties that, 
with the exception of De Oratore, Brutus, and Orator, the Oxford Classical Texts 
series began publishing the Latin texts of Cicero’s philosophical works.  To date they 
                                                 
73
 Lucretius, De Rerum "atura I, edited by P. Michael Brown (London, 1984). 
 
74
 Lucretius, De Rerum "atura, edited by William Ellery Leonard and Stanley Barney 
Smith (Madison, 1942). 
 
75
 Cicero, On the "ature of the Gods, trans. P. G. Walsh (Oxford, 1998). 
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have yet to release an edition of De "atura Deorum.  Thus the most easily accessible 
and readily used Latin edition by English speakers is that of H. Rackham, published 
in the Loeb Classical Library series.
76
  Those in need of help with grammar and 
syntax should begin with Richard McKirahin’s edition of the first book of De "atura 
Deorum.
77
  More recently, Andrew R. Dyck has also published a commentary with 
text on the first book of De "atura Deorum in the Cambridge Greek and Latin 
Classics series.
78
  Its main strength lies in its very helpful notes on philosophical 
issues and stylistics; its introduction is much too brief and pays too much attention to 
the Quellenforschung approach to understanding Cicero and De "atura Deorum.  
Those wishing for more comprehensive help with stylistics and historical context may 
wish to consult A. E. Pease’s monumental two-volume edition,
79
 or Joseph B. 
Mayor’s three-volume edition, recently re-released in the Cambridge Library 
Collection.
80
  Pease’s edition is still considered the standard commentary on the text.  
Mayor’s edition suffers from the defects listed above, in particular, reading Cicero as 
an amateur philosopher and the De "atura Deorum as little more than a patchwork of 
Greek sources; nevertheless, it still offers extensive and useful notes on the text at the 
end of each volume. 
                                                 
76
 Cicero, De "atura Deorum, Academica, trans. H. Rackham (Ann Arbor, 1933). 
 
77
 Cicero, De "atura Deorum I, edited by Richard McKirahan (Indianapolis, 1997). 
 
78
 Cicero, De "atura Deorum Book I, edited by Andrew R. Dyck (Cambridge, 2003). 
 
79
 Cicero, De "atura Deorum, 2 Vol., edited by A. E. Pease (Cambridge, 1955-58). 
 
80
 Cicero, De "atura Deorum Libri Tres, 3 Vol., edited by Joseph B. Mayor and J. H. 
Swainson (Cambridge, 2010). 
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With respect to Cicero’s De Legibus, the best English edition is that of James 
E. G. Zetzel.
81
  It, too, is largely attentive to Cicero’s word choice and contains a 
fairly helpful introduction, synopsis, and bibliography.  The standard Latin edition is 
the recently published Oxford Classical Texts volume containing De Re Publica, De 
Legibus, Cato Maior De Senectute, and Laelius De Amicitia, edited by J. G. F. 
Powell.
82
  Again, as with all books in the Oxford Classical Texts series, the reader is 
presented with only the text and critical annotations.  Those wishing for help with 
grammar and syntax would do well to refer to Niall Rudd and Thomas Wiedemann’s 
helpful, if difficult to find, edition of the first book of De Legibus.
83
  Finally, for those 
wishing for more comprehensive help with matters of historical context and 
intertextual references, as well as wanting to consult various indexes on all manner of 
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 Cicero, On the Commonwealth and On the Laws, trans. and edited by James E. G. 
Zetzel (Cambridge, 1999). 
 
82
 Cicero, De Re Publica, De Legibus, Cato Maior de Senectute, Laelius de Amicitia, 
edited by J. G. F. Powell (Oxford, 2006). 
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 Andrew R. Dyck, A Commentary on Cicero’s De Legibus (Ann Arbor, 2004). 
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The most developed form of classical conventionalism is Epicureanism and the 
greatest and most comprehensive account of Epicureanism is to be found in the 
Roman Lucretius’ epic poem, De Rerum "atura or On the "ature of Things.  Divided 
into six books, the first book of De Rerum "atura introduces subjects found 
throughout the entire poem, specifically, Epicurean principles of atomism and the 
infinity of the universe, matter, and space.  Book two continues and develops this 
atomic theory.  Book three discusses the structure and morality of the mind and soul, 
as well as the needless fear of death.  Book four treats of various physiological and 
psychology issues, most notably, love.  Book six concludes the poem with a 
discussion of atmospheric and terrestrial phenomena.
85
  But it is the fifth book which 
is focused on here because it is in the fifth book that Lucretius discusses the 
concurrent origins of religion and political society.
86
  In understanding what Lucretius 
                                                 
85
 The subdivisions within this general structure are extensive and will be discussed 
as appropriate over the course of the chapter.  Lucretius’ more subtle structural 
arrangement is discussed in the third section. 
 
86
 Cf. Nichols, Epicurean Political Philosophy, p. 18: “The most extensive discussion 
of religion by Lucretius occurs in the latter part of Book V and is placed immediately 
after he describes the coming into being of political society proper.  Religion is 
treated at greater length than any other single development (V, 1161-1240).  The 
theological question is central throughout the entire poem.  Lucretius does not merely 
attack religion; he gradually sets forth a profound analysis of the roots of religion in 
the human soul and how they put forth their growth as men interact (in ways that 
change with time) with the surrounding world.” 
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teaches about the origin of religion and how it relates to the development of political 
society, we may draw nearer to the conditions Lucretius and thus Epicureanism held 
necessary for happiness.  The fifth book as a whole attempts to disclose the origin of 
our world.  The latter half specifically addresses the development of man.
87
  It is the 
longest and most complete Epicurean account of the subject to be found,
88
 and may 
be divided into three principal sections: primitive men, pre-political society, and 
political society.
89
  As the fifth book contains Lucretius’ most extensive discussion of 
man, I begin with it, returning afterwards to earlier books. 
 The single most defining characteristic in Lucretius’ account of primitive men 
and pre-political society is man’s ignorance of eternity.  Primitive men knew nothing 
of fire or the arts, custom or law.  Their ignorance of custom or law, convention, is 
particularly striking.  The reason is that primitive men knew nothing of familial 
association; men and women established no lasting unions.
90
  Each lived by himself 
for himself.
91
  Nor did primitive men fear the gods as they were yet to suspect an end 
to their visible world: 
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Nor with great wailing did they wander about in fear 
through the fields in the dark of night seeking daylight and the sun, 
but they waited expectantly, silent and buried deep in sleep, 
until the sun with rosy torch would infuse the sky with light. 
For since from their earliest childhood they were always accustomed to see 
darkness and light come about at alternate times, 
it was impossible that wonder should ever be able to arise, 
or despair that everlasting darkness might hold the earth 




Venus alone, that is, the pleasure of the moment, was worshipped.  Wild 
beasts were feared as was death.  However, death was feared not out of any concern 
for eternity, only pain.
93
  Lucretius’ primitive men are very much like Nietzsche’s 
ahistorical animal, tethered to the moment, knowing nothing of past or future.
94
  
Being so ignorant, so was man happy.
95
 
 Pre-political society, man’s first society, was brought about by huts, pelts, fire 
and, above all, the emergence of lasting unions between men and women, the family.  
It is in the family and that collection of the first families, united by contract for 
mutual aid, that we find part of the origin of convention.  Now Venus, “lessened 
[man’s] strength, and children by their winning ways easily broke down the harsh 
character of their parents.”
96
  This is to say: Venus, which had hitherto served the 
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pleasures of individuals living in the moment, now served a very new love, the love 
of one’s own.  Such a love has the seeds of concerns beyond those of the simple 
present, but the past (legitimacy) and future (inheritance).  Man became invested in 
his own family and, by extension, the union of families which formed his pre-political 
society.  Such a society would have been impossible if not for the other part of the 
origin of convention, the invention of language.
97
  Language was invented not by any 
man or god, but came about by nature, much as other beasts give off noises to 
communicate feelings.   Man of pre-political society still feared death in the same 
manner as did primitive man.  He still did not question the eternity of his visible 
world and so did not doubt his own or his society’s permanence.
98
  Fear may have 
been a decisive motive for uniting families, but it was fear for the safety of one’s own 
newly formed family.
99
  This establishment of the family and union of several 
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accounts.  However, of the three only Aristotle maintained that the constitution of 
society and, especially, the eventual founding of political society, which the polis 
represented, was the highest form of human community; that is, only Aristotle 
advocated a teleological account.
102
  The development of society as presented by 
Lucretius is not a teleological perfection of man, but an escape from nastier 
circumstances.
103
  In this respect he is more in agreement with Hobbes.
104
  Finally, 
while the human race had softened from its primitive beginnings, man was still 
fundamentally ignorant and thus relatively happy.
105
  Relatively, because while there 
were yet to be laws and harsh punishments, and thus painful coercion, there were still 
the new conventional concerns of family and society, which are forms of coercion 
and thus somewhat painful in their own right. 
 Political society emerged from pre-political society with the founding of the 
first cities by the first kings.  Initially these kings distributed flocks and fields to men 
based, not on equality, but superiority of beauty, strength, and, less so, intelligence.  
Then afterwards property was invented and gold discovered.  Inheritance was passed 
over time from those men superior by nature to lesser men superior only by 
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convention.  Money took precedence over merit.  The change resulted in the eventual 
destruction of kingship and an individual scramble for power.   This violence was 
ultimately ended and magistracies and laws were established.
106
  The establishment of 
political society is considered by Lucretius to be a mixed blessing: henceforth the fear 
of punishment for transgressing the laws taints the pleasures of life.
107
  Just as pre-
political society would have been impossible without the invention of language, so 
too political society, the arts, and especially religion.
108
  Very well: what is the origin 
of religion and how did it make political society possible?
109
 
Lucretius gives two causes for the origin of religion.  Both are actually the 
same cause.  The first cause is that men saw the supernatural strength of the gods in 
their dreams; a strength that made men suppose that since the gods had none of their 
weaknesses, so too must they have none of their fears—especially the weakness of 
mortality and the fear of death.
110
  This led men to the second cause.  Looking up 
with fearful, uncomprehending eyes at the motions of the heavens, men assumed 
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them to be the workings of these powerful gods.
111
  But primitive men and those 
living in pre-political society, too, had looked up at the heavens and they had not been 




For when we gaze up at the heavenly regions of the great 
universe and the ether above set with shining stars, 
and thoughts of the paths of the sun and the moon enter our minds, 
then into our hearts oppressed by other evils this 
care too begins to raise its awakened head, 
that by chance we are faced with the immense power 
of the gods, which rotates the bright stars with their varying motions. 
For lack of a rational explanation assails our uncertain mind 
about whether there was any first creation of the world, 
and likewise whether there is an end, until which 
the walls of the world can endure this work of restless motion, 
or whether, forever granted protection by the gods’ will, 
they are able to glide through an eternal tract of time 





The emergence of religion, according to Lucretius, is the direct result of the 
dawning of a fundamental fear: that the lovable is not eternal, nor the eternal lovable.  
Man had become attached to his family, his society, his visible world: he loved his 
“own”.  The thought that the world, his society, or he himself might in time face 
complete annihilation terrified him.  Prior to the emergence of political society and 
the development of the arts, men were oblivious to this suspicion.  Being innocent 
they did not suspect that the visible universe might not be well-disposed to them, let 
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alone hostile or ephemeral.  When doubt crept in they grew afraid and savage towards 
one another.
113
  The now shaken “walls of the world” had to be buttressed and it was 
active gods which provided the support and consolation.  Their supernatural 
guarantees replaced fickle or troubling natural ones.  Man’s nature as it emerged with 
the cultivation of convention did not allow him to live with the fundamental fear.  He 
took sanctuary within a salutary delusion.
 114
  This is the first part of the function of 
religion.  The other part concerns how religion made political society possible.  More 
must and will be said on this when considering Lucretius’ conception of political man 
in the third section.  However, the argument on behalf of the fundamental fear is only 
valid if there is reason to suspect that the first beginnings of the universe are blind, 




The fundamental fear that the lovable is not eternal, nor the eternal lovable can only 
be seriously entertained if there is no purposeful eternal order.  This is a suspicion 
supported by a rudderless, materialistic, natural philosophy.  Whether it is reasonable 
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remains to be seen.  We must question Lucretius’ teaching regarding the primeval 
first things and the creation of the world. 
The first beginnings of the universe, according to Lucretius, an adherent of the 
natural philosophy of Epicurus,
115
 are matter and void.  Matter can be touched and is 
able to act or be acted upon.
116
  Void is empty space within which matter is able to 
move.
117
  The indestructible finite component of matter is said to be the atom.  Atoms 
include no void and are invisible to the naked eye.  Only the atoms are eternal; all 
other possible compositions of the atoms are temporary and thus perish with time.
118
  
The atoms move continuously with enormous speed and violence, clashing with one 
another.  In the infinity of such atomic motion, various compositions emerge, 
including our visible world and man.
119
  But they are not purposeful.  Neither our 
world nor man enjoys a privileged place within nature.  Indeed, the universe is 
infinite and has no center.
120
  Our world is but one of a great many worlds.
 121
  It and 
man are simply one of an infinite number of coincidental combinations given 
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fortuitous circumstance.  Further, anything that is not strictly a property of matter or 
void is said to be an accident of them.   Thus weight, temperature, and density are 
properties.  Slavery and freedom, poverty and wealth, war and peace, in short, human 
conventions, are accidents.
122
   
Lucretius strongly cautions against attributing any divine agency to these 
workings of nature, especially any notion that the chance composition of our world 
came about for our sake or that it is eternal and will not perish.
123
  Supposing there 
were gods, perfect self-sufficient beings have no needs.  As entia perfestissima they 
neither create out of care nor craft out of malice, for they have no reason to act as 
such.  What advantage, asks Lucretius, could gratitude on the part of man bring to 
beings immortal and happy so that they would intervene on our behalf?  What would 
entice them, inactive before, to activity now?  What would prompt them to any act of 
creation, let alone of man?  And even if they had wished to create the universe and 
man, from what source was there first implanted in the gods a model for creating?  
Would not this source have been nature?
124
 
In short, Epicurean natural philosophy makes reasonable the suspicion that 
there is no purposeful order for eternity, no providence.  There is only coincidental 
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order for a time, temporarily predictable atomic compounds owed in the final analysis 
to the chance blows of mindless, meaningless, matter in motion.  The title of 
Lucretius’ poem now makes sense.  The “nature of things” as the Epicureans 
understood it is the permanence of atoms, void, and the occurrence of chance atomic 
collision, nothing more.  Yet as Lucretius indicated in his discussion of the 
development of religion, man’s political nature, his own predicable order for a time, 
cannot tolerate this suspicion.  Religion alleviates it.  Religion also in turn made 




The first function of religion, according to Lucretius, as discussed in the first section, 
is to relieve man of the fundamental fear introduced with the development of the arts 
in political society.  That fear is that the lovable is not eternal, nor the eternal lovable.  
It is feared because of man’s attachment to the world, an attachment especially honed 
with the cultivation of societal conventions.  Pleasure was redirected from those of 
individuals living in the moment, each by himself for himself, first, to those of one’s 
own family and by extension, pre-political society, and then, subsequently, political 
society.  Epicurean natural philosophy only makes the suspicion of the fundamental 
fear more certain.  It makes a mockery of that which man came to be concerned with 
most.
125
  Thus if one were to teach such a potentially terrible truth, there would be a 
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need for a medium between man’s attachment to the world and Epicurean natural 
philosophy.
 126
  That medium is poetry.
127
  And Lucretius is a philosopher-poet. 
 Lucretius is very aware that because his teaching attacks the divine assurances 
of man’s import in a providential order, it will provoke resistance on the part of his 
readers.
128
  He does not expect to truly persuade many readers, even a very few 
readers.
129
  Lucretius twice outlines his rhetorical program in a famous passage which 
I quote at length: 
 
 
Now roused by this in my lively mind 
I am traversing the remote places of the Picrides, untrodden by the sole 
of anyone before.  It is a joy to approach pure springs 
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and to drink from them, and it is a joy to pick new flowers 
and to seek a preeminent crown for my head from that place 
whence the Muses had wreathed the temples of no one before; 
first because I am teaching about great things and proceeding 
to free the mind from the narrow bonds of religion, 
next because I am writing so clear a poem about so obscure 
a subject, touching everything with the charm of the Muses. 
For this too seems to be not without reason. 
But just as when physicians try to give loathsome wormwood 
to children, they first touch the rim of the cup all 
around with the sweet, golden liquid of honey, 
so that the unsuspectingly age of children may be tricked as far 
as their lips, and so that meanwhile the child might drink down 
the bitter wormwood justice and though deceived, be not deceased, 
but rather by such means be restored and become well, 
so I now, since this system seems for the most part to be 
too bitter to those who have not tried it and 
the common people shrink back from it, I wanted to explain 
our system to you in sweet-spoken Pierian song, 
and touch it, so to speak, with the sweet honey of the Muses. 
I have done so in the hope I might in this way be able to hold 
your attention in our verses, until you look into the whole 





Lucretius’ rhetorical program introduces the philosophical child, the potential 
Epicurean, to the bitter draught of natural philosophy by first touching the rim of the 
cup with the sweet honey of poetry.  The arrangement of the poem as a whole is a 
product of this strategy.  Each tenet of the anti-teleological, anti-theological doctrine 
outlined above in the second section is first introduced in a pleasing way.  Gradually 
Lucretius removes the poetic veils throughout his poem until finally by the fifth book 
nature is left unadorned.
 131
  For example, when introducing the concept in the first 
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book that nothing ever comes into being out of nothing through divine agency, and 
that nothing is destroyed into nothing, in explaining the latter tenet Lucretius finds 
himself in a position where he must discuss perishing.
132
  Such a topic carried to its 
final conclusion concerns the complete annihilation of both the world and human 
beings back into atoms.  But Lucretius only reveals this at the end of his long poem.  
He first sweetens in the concept. Discussion of animate objects, much less human 
beings, is avoided and only the perishing of inanimate objects is discussed.  In their 
place a cheerful picture of continuous rebirth is painted.
133
  It is only in the fifth book 




Lucretius is not addressing all men, for the many recoil in horror from his 
doctrines.  Consider that in the above passage on Lucretius’ rhetorical program, 
“retroque volgus abhorret ab hac,”
 135
 which Englert translates as, “and the common 
people shrink back from it,” may perhaps be better translated as, “and the many recoil 
in horror from it.”  The noun volgus refers to the many or the masses.  The verb 
abhorret, from which English derives the word “abhor,” means to recoil back in 
horror or dread.  This motion of recoil is further reinforced by the adverb retro, 
meaning “backwards.”  Hac refers to Lucretius’ Epicurean doctrines as a whole.  De 
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Rerum "atura is principally directed at the potential few Epicureans, those of sound 
mind, but perhaps still ignorant of the nature of things.
136
  Yet even these must be 
gradually introduced to Lucretius’ bitter teaching, especially the fundamental fear, by 
means of sweet poetry.  They too might initially fear the supernatural punishment 
which they have been told awaits those after death who by use of their reason attempt 
to assail the walls of the world.
137
  In short, Lucretius wrote as a philosopher-poet 
because poetry eases the transition from a religious to a philosophical (Epicurean) 
understanding of the whole.  Enough has been said on the first part of the function of 
religion and Lucretius’ rhetorical sensitivity to it.  It remains for us to consider the 
second part, how religion also makes political society possible. 
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 The traditional view that Lucretius believed religion so much superstition to 
be overcome is supported by his assertion in the first book that religion is “more 
commonly” responsible for crime, such as with the sacrifice of Iphigenia by her own 
father Agamemnon.
138
  The sacrifice of a child by a parent is certainly as against the 
grain of the love of one’s own as possible.  And yet Agamemnon does it so that the 
Greeks might appease Diana and continue on to Troy—that is to say: he does it for 
the political good.  Colman comments:  
 
 
Traditional piety we may suspect leads man to consider something higher than 
his own personal interest, such as the political community.  The sacrifice 
shows the need to sacrifice one’s own good for the good for the city.  We are 
thus opened to the possibility that a political community without religious 





Lucretius’ fullest discussion of the relationship between traditional piety and 
political health is found in his presentation of the cult of the Magna Mater or Great 
Mother.
 140
  The Magna Mater was Cybele, a mother-goddess of Antolia (Turkey) 
imported to Rome in 205/4 BC.  She was worshipped annually with public games 
during the festival of the Megalensia.
141
  Here more than in any other passage of De 
Rerum "atura have scholars noted Lucretius’ moderate, even sympathetic appraisal 
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of religion as a restraining influence.
142
  In the context of speaking of the composition 
of atoms in the second book, Lucretius eventually turns to the composition of the 
earth.  He denies the earth’s divinity by a detailed description of the ancestral view as 
presented in the procession of the Magna Mater.  The ancient and learned Greek poets 
had explained the meaning of the procession in various ways of which Lucretius 
gives seven; four of these are especially noteworthy.  The second symbol given offers 
encouragement to parents with respect to the education of their children.  The fifth, 
condemnation of and warning to those who violate the Mother and are ungrateful to 
their parents.  The sixth, filling the ungrateful minds and impious hearts of the 
multitude (volgi) with fear of the divine majesty of the goddess.  And the seventh, a 
divine commandment to defend one’s country and parents.
143
  All four emphasize the 
importance of honoring and defending the conventions of one’s political society.
144
  
Previously in the second book, per the second section above, Lucretius had rejected 
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the teleological-theological account of nature as an error.
145
  He repeats that view 
here, but a new perspective on religion is introduced.  The passage on the Magna 
Mater illustrates how the majority of men conduct themselves given the belief in 
supernatural gods who punish a lack of patriotism and filial piety.  The procession 
symbolizes what is necessary for the health of political society.  It connects the 
patriotism and allegiance man feels for his political society to a cosmological and 
religious teaching from where the ancestral or conventional good is said to originate.
 
146
  The addressee of De Rerum "atura is himself such a patriotic man; one wonders 
what would happen if his concern for the common good were removed by Lucretius’ 
Epicurean doctrines.
147
  Was not Roman piety, as Polybius observed, responsible for 
“the foundation of Roman greatness?”
148
  At any rate, while admittedly salutary and 
necessary for political life, in concluding his description of the procession, Lucretius 
remarks: “Although this is set forth and related well and excellently, nevertheless it is 
far removed from true reasoning.”
149
 
Religion is thus portrayed by Lucretius, first, as a response by man to feel at 
home in an indifferent or ephemeral world, and, second, as grudgingly necessary for 
                                                 
145
 DR" 2.165-82. 
 
146
 DR" 2.644-60.  Cf. Colman, “Lucretius on Religion,” p. 230-31; Strauss, “Notes 
on Lucretius,” p. 100. 
 
147
 DR" 1.41-3.  The addressee is one “Memmius”, probably Gaius Memmius, the 
patron of the Roman poet Catullus.  Cf. Nichols, Epicurean Political Philosophy, pp. 
41-5; Strauss, “Notes on Lucretius,” p. 100. 
 
148
 Polybius 6.56. 
 
149
 DR" 2.644-45. 
 
  49 
 
the health of his political society.  The function of religion is thus not only the 
alleviation of the fundamental fear, but also a means to uphold the conventions of 
political society.  It is therefore not unwarranted to conclude that man, as Lucretius 
describes him, is something of a religious-political animal.  Yet if Lucretius is aware 
of this theological-political problem, why did he side against it?  What did he 




Epicureanism equates the good with the pleasant and the bad with the painful.  
However, unlike Aristotelian conceptions of pleasure, Epicureanism does not 
maintain a hierarchy of the pleasant.  To understand the classical Epicurean theory of 
pleasure and thus happiness, we must turn from Lucretius, who speaks of it but 
little,
150
 to his master, Epicurus.  Epicurus had taught that pleasure was constitutive 
pleasure (hedone katastematike).
151
  When Epicurus was later accused of giving 
pleasure two meanings, pleasure in motion or positive pleasure, and pleasure at rest or 
constitutive pleasure, the accusation was founded on a misunderstanding.  Epicurus 
saw positive pleasure as not essentially differing from constitutive pleasure, for the 
former was the beginning of the latter.  He held that both are two aspects of the same 
reality, that of an equilibrium adjusting: 
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As to the pleasure that is added to the equilibrium and is produced by it….We 
see, in effect, that according to the most explicit texts pleasure is a limit 
(peras) that cannot be exceeded.  No doubt a pleasure accompanies the motion 
of the organism when it works to reestablish the equilibrium that has been 
momentarily destroyed: that is pleasure in motion.  Further, since this pleasure 
involves a disappearance of the equilibrium, it is by that very fact 
accompanied by pain.  When the pain ceases, that is to say when the 
equilibrium is reestablished, pleasure is naturally produced.  It is what it can 
be; it entails neither augmentation nor diminution….It is enough to make pain 
disappear for pleasure to appear: not because this suppression, something 
entirely negative, is by itself pleasure; but because, at the moment when it 
takes place, by virtue of the natural action of the organs, by a law of nature, 






Two important consequences follow from Epicurus’ theory of pleasure.  First, 
Epicurus firmly yoked pleasure to corporeal equilibrium.  For Epicurus, there is no 
other kind of pleasure.
153
  Second, all objects of pleasure are valuable, not in 
themselves, but only insofar as they serve to produce physical well-being or health.
154
  
But, to take up the first point, does not Epicurus speak of the pleasures of the soul?  
Indeed, but not if one means by “pleasures of the soul” those radically different from 
those of the body.  All pleasures are without exception pleasures of the body; those 
pleasures called spiritual are only varieties of the one unique pleasure called 
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 Brochard, “The Theory of Pleasure According to Epicurus,” pp. 66-8. 
 




  Being so, to take up the second point, one can say Epicurus maintained 
no hierarchy of pleasure.  In reducing all pleasure to a single pleasure, the corporeal, 
Epicurus erased any distinction between the objects that induce man’s choice.
156
  
Why choose intellectual pleasures if in the final analysis they are not worth more than 
the pleasures of taste or those of Venus?  Why choose sobriety or temperance?  As 




What then of philosophy and the philosopher?  How can it be that the wise 
man is more inclined towards happiness?  What is happiness to an Epicurean?  
Happiness is only worthy of the name if it lasts, not for an instant, but a lifetime.
158
  If 
corporeal pleasure is the sole good, one has but to find the means to ensure that it 
lasts indefinitely.  Enter the so-called “pleasures of the soul.”  The wise man may 
better guarantee pleasure and ward off pain if he knows how to moderate himself and 
accept the limits of pleasure.  Such a use of reason in no way changes the nature of 
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pleasure; it simply ensures its continuation.
159
  Wisdom therefore consists of choosing 
those things—including opinions—most favorable to corporeal pleasure and rejecting 
all those prone to sadness or fear and thus pain.  So it is that Epicureanism and thus 
Lucretius relentlessly assaulted the fear of death and the fear of the gods which, they 
say, falsely disturb the soul and create needless pain.
160
  So it is that in Lucretius’ 
account of the development of man, the relatively non-coercive but secure pre-
political society was the most pleasant society and thus the society most in 
accordance with nature.
161
  And so it is that the philosopher philosophizes, for in so 
doing, he ensures his continual pleasure.  By distancing himself from political society 
and contemplating the continuation and limits of his pleasure, he alone may be said to 
be truly happy.
162
  Yet as has been discussed in the third section, philosophy is 
repulsive to the majority of men because philosophy requires freedom from 
attachment to “our world.”  Thus the majority of men living in political society 
cannot partake in the remedial pleasure of philosophy.  Nor can mankind return to 
pre-political society.  Instead they must trudge on, coerced by painful political society 
and religion, living an unnatural life.  Further, unlike Hobbes and modern 
Epicureanism, Lucretius and classical Epicureanism entertain no hopes of alleviating 
man’s lot by attempting to conquer an indifferent or hostile nature.  Philosophy or 
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knowledge is not pursued for the sake of power, but the ability to live truthfully, 
moderately, in conformity with man’s natural limitations.
163
 
Here we must part ways with Lucretius.  His rejection of the theological-
political problem seems to ignore his own most important findings regarding religion 
and the nature of political man.  Is it indeed the case that false opinions necessarily 
disturb the soul?  Lucretius’ own discussion of the first part of the function of religion 
strongly suggests that political man is far happier relieved of the fundamental fear, 
should such a suspicion be reasonable.  Is it indeed the case that one should pursue 
his individual bodily pleasure at the expense of his participation in political society?  
Lucretius’ own discussion of the second part of the function of religion carries 
considerable weigh in revealing how the majority of men behave given a belief in 
providential gods who reward virtue and punish vice, should political society require 
such means to uphold its conventions.  With respect to this latter concern, it is very 
revealing that Lucretius never once explicitly raises the question as to whether the 
fear of divine punishment actually deters crime.  Lucretius implicitly lays the blame 
for much of man’s avarice, ambition, and crime to a fear of death.  In order to avoid 
being despised, poor, and insecure, all reminders of man’s precarious position, says 
Lucretius, brother will slay brother, child will betray parent, and citizen will rebel 
against his fatherland in order to improve his situation.
164
  But Lucretius’ reasoning is 
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unconvincing.  It is very questionable as to whether the fear of death causing such 
crimes is the specifically religious fear of death, the fear of divine punishment after 
death.  Such fear may very well deter men from crime, as Lucretius own example of 
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Lucretius had suspected that the fundamental fear weighed heavily on man; Cicero 
was more certain of it.  Lucretius had tentatively recognized its political implications; 
Cicero began with them.  Lucretius had reluctantly incorporated the needs of the 
citizen into his work on natural philosophy; Cicero’s philosophical works start from 
the perspective of the citizen and surface only indirectly to natural philosophy.  Thus 
to better understand those needs of man which have nothing to do with his body, it is 
helpful to turn from Lucretius to his Roman contemporary, Cicero.
166
  Cicero’s most 
comprehensive account of the relationship between providence and political society is 
found in his De "atura Deorum or On the "ature of the Gods, and, with respect to 
Epicureanism, book one.  Divided into three books, the first book of De "atura 
Deorum offers a preface by Cicero as the author, a brief account of the settling of the 
dialogue, the Epicurean case for the gods, and, finally, a critique of the Epicurean 
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  The second book is entirely devoted to the Stoic case for the gods; the 
third, a little more than two-thirds extant, a critique of the Stoic account.
168
 
Unlike Lucretius’ De Rerum "atura, Cicero’s De "atura Deorum is a 
dialogue.  Although Cicero wrote dialogues in the manner of Aristotle in which the 
speeches of the other interlocutors were introduced in such a way that the principal 
part rested with the author himself,
 169
 a role Cicero was only too happy to assume in 
other dialogues,
170
 here Cicero chose for himself the role of mute Academic.  He 
speaks only three times,
 
twice in the proem and once at the conclusion to deliver his 
famous verdict in favor of Stoicism,
171
 a verdict which contrasts sharply with his own 
explicit wish to conceal his opinions,
172
 his professed allegiance to the Academy,
173
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 Apart from the character “Cicero” in the dialogue proper, Cicero the author 
delivers a Preface to the reader.
175
  In it he identifies the crux of the discussion to 
follow in terms strikingly similar to those of Lucretius: 
 
There is particularly wide disagreement [among the philosophers] on the most 
important element in the case: are the gods inactive and idle, absenting 
themselves totally from the supervision and government of the universe, or is 
the opposite true, that they created and established all things from the 





The crucial issue concerning the gods is providence.  The reason for 
providence’s importance, according to Cicero, is similar to that given by Lucretius.  If 
the activities touching upon religious obligation owed by man for divine supervision 
are mere façade and pretence, they can contain no true devotion; if they contain no 
true devotion, then all sense of the holy and of religious obligation is destroyed.  
“Once those disappear, our lives become fraught with disturbance and great chaos.  It 
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is conceivable that, if reverence for the gods is removed, trust and the social bond 






The conversation on the nature of the gods abstracts from nearly all normal 
considerations of dramatic details.  Contrasted with many other Ciceronian dialogues 
with clearly defined backgrounds and touches of local color,
178
 De "atura Deorum 
with its mere skeleton of a dramatic introduction, lack of local color, and spontaneous 
conversation is unique.
179
  It seems to have been necessary to remove such a 
controversial discussion as much as possible from political life.  This is not to say that 
political life in the most important respects is forgotten. 
 The scene opens with a younger Cicero
180
 entering his friend and fellow-
Academic Gaius Aurelius Cotta’s
181
 house, Cotta having invited Cicero.  The 
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 At the dramatic date of the dialogue, 76 BC, Cicero is thirty years old.  He appears 
at Cotta’s house as an auditor.  He had been in Greece and Rhodes between 79-77 and 
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occasion is the Latin festival.
182
  Cicero finds Cotta seated in an alcove, engaged in 
debate on the nature of the gods with the Epicurean Gaius Velleius
183
 and Stoic 
Quintus Lucilius Balbus.
184
  Cotta, seeing Cicero approach and knowing of his 
interest in philosophy, asks him to join them.  Cotta requests Velleius to recapitulate 
his initial remarks on Epicurus’ views of the gods.  Velleius agrees, but notes with a 
grin that Cicero’s arrival reinforces Cotta’s school rather than his own or Balbus’.  
This combined with Cotta’s remark on Cicero’s philosophical interests, as well as 
Cicero’s own in the Preface,
185
 mark Cicero as one who, already at the age of thirty, 
had acquired a reputation for philosophical proclivities, especially Academic ones.  
But just as in the Preface, the younger Cicero attempts to distance himself a bit from 
his school by declaring his impartiality.
186
 
                                                                                                                                           
celebrate a triumph.  Cf. Levine, “The Original Design and the Publication of the De 
Natura Deorum,” p. 8; Walsh, The "ature of the Gods, pp. xxxviii-xxxix. 
 
182
 The Latin Festival (Feriae Latinae) was a movable feast arranged by the consuls 
between April and July.  Cf. Walsh, The "ature of the Gods, p. 149 n. 15. 
 
183
 Gaius Velleius is said by Cicero to be a senator and the leading Roman Epicurean 
of his day.  Nothing more is known; however, the odd contrast between Velleius’ 
activity in political life and his school’s distance from it is notable.  Cf. "D 1.15; 
Levine, “The Original Design and the Publication of the De Natura Deorum,” p. 8; 
Walsh, The "ature of the Gods, p. xxxviii. 
 
184
 Quintus Lucilius Balbus is said by Cicero to be a Stoic of preeminence; a Roman, 
but one whose studies in Stoicism equaled the Greeks.  Ibid. 
 
185
 "D 1.6-7, 11-12. 
 
186
 "D 1.17. 
 
  60 
 
Velleius opens his account of Epicurus’ views on the gods with an attack on 
the doctrine of providence from the standpoint of Epicurean natural philosophy.  His 
criticisms are highly reminiscent of Lucretius’: 
 
What you are going to hear are no airy-fairy, fanciful opinions, like the 
craftsman-god in Plato’s Timaeus who constructs the world,
187
 or the 
prophetic old lady whom the Stoics call Pronoia, and whom in Latin we can 
term Providentia.  I am not going to speak of the universe itself as a round, 
blazing, revolving deity endowed with mind and feelings.  These are the 
prodigies and wonders of philosophers who prefer dreaming to reasoning.  I 
ask you, what sort of mental vision enabled your teacher Plato to envisage the 
construction of so massive a work, the assembling and building of the 
universe by the god in the way which he describes?  What was his technique 
of building?  What were his tools and levers and scaffolding?  Who were his 
helpers in so vast an enterprise?. . . . 
 
Do you maintain that Plato had the slightest acquaintance with natural 
philosophy, when he believes that anything which had a beginning can last for 
ever?  What compound is there which does not break up?  What thing has 
some sort of beginning but has no end?  Now if your Stoic Pronoia, Lucilius, 





 Like Lucretius, Velleius asks how the universe, which was created and 
therefore had a beginning, can be eternal and therefore have no end?  Is Plato’s claim 
that the creation is made eternal by the will of the creator reasonable?
189
  Further, why 
would such a god, inactive before, suddenly become active and wish to create?  For a 
boundless measure of time before the creation, the universe did not exist; what motive 
could have induced a god to fashion the heavens, our world, or man?  To assume a 
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motive for creation one must assume the god or gods anything but perfect.  Did he 
take pleasure in the varied adornment which we behold in the heavens and on earth?  
What pleasure can a god take in such things?  If he did derive pleasure from them, 
how could he have forgone them for so long?  And even supposing the god was 
prompted to an act of creation, says Velleius, can anyone seriously claim that this 
provision was made for the benefit of human beings?  If it was for man, was it merely 
for the wise?  If so, such an edifice was created for but a very few.  Was it for the 
many?  If so, it was for the benefit of fools.  Such a world created brings to them so 
many inconveniences that while the wise in their wisdom may at least alleviate their 
suffering, fools in their foolishness can neither avoid imminent hardships nor endure 
them when they are present.
190
 
 What does such a creator-god even look like?  Shall we say he is the world or 
the universe itself?  For those who imagine that the world possesses life and wisdom, 
says Velleius, they have utterly failed to see into what shape an intelligent mind can 
be installed.  Why believe a god endowed with immortality and blessedness spherical 
in shape merely because Plato assumed no shape more beautiful than the sphere?  
Why not the cylinder, cube, cone, or pyramid?  And what a hellish life Plato assigned 
to his god—spun round at speeds the like of which cannot be conceived!  Is mental 
stability or happiness even possible in such a state?  If god is the universe, what can 
be said for the massive traits of earth which cannot be populated or cultivated, some 
scorched by the sun, others in the hard grip of snow?  If the universe is god and such 
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desolate lands are part of the universe, we must assume that some of god’s limbs are 
ablaze, others frozen stiff!
191
 
 Concluding his attack on the doctrine of providence and following a lengthy 
critique of past understandings of the nature of the gods,
192
 Velleius turns to 
Epicurus’ own teaching, but first is compelled to praise him in very much the manner 
Lucretius had in the proem to book five: “If anyone were to contemplate the 
thoughtless and random nature of all these claims, he would be bound to revere 




Velleius does not question the existence of the gods.  The gods exist, he says, 
because we have an innate awareness of them; all people, everywhere, have some 
conception of the gods.  Something which all people agree on must be true.
194
  Thus 
Velleius accepts the argument ex consensu gentium.  This innate awareness causes us 
to believe the gods blessed and immortal.  “What is blessed and immortal neither is 
troubled itself, nor causes trouble to its neighbor; thus it is gripped by neither anger 
nor partiality, for all such attitudes are a mark of weakness.”
195
  Since reverence is 
rightly accorded to what is supreme, men owe devotion to the gods, namely, in 
freeing themselves from superstition.  Contemplation of the divine nature excises all 
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fear of the gods for, after all, they cannot be roused to anger or partiality.
196
  The gods 
can have no other than human shape; for not only do they take no other form in our 
waking or sleeping hours, but what other form is as beautiful as the human and thus 
befitting the blessed and immortal nature of the gods?
197
  But being immortal, they 
cannot be said to be corporeal because then they would have a beginning and thus an 
end.  Therefore the gods are quasi-corporeal and have quasi-blood.
198
  Unlike 
providential gods, Epicurus’ gods are wholly inactive, taking pleasure only in their 
own wisdom and virtue, utterly self-sufficient.  Unlike providential gods, which seem 
plagued with the labor of governing, Epicurean gods, “define the life of blessedness 
as residing in the possession of untroubled minds and relaxing from all duties.”
199
  In 
short, the happiness of Epicurean gods, much like Epicureans themselves, consists of 
distancing themselves from the duties of government and contemplating their own 
individual pleasure. 
Velleius advocates such anti-teleological, anti-theological views for precisely 
the same reasons as Lucretius: Epicurean natural philosophy teaches that there are 
innumerable worlds, ours being but one;
200
 the universe is infinite, our world and man 
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being at the center of nothing;
201
 all compounds arise from the blind collisions of the 
blind atoms’ flights, man and all that concerns man being merely a chance 
combination and therefore an accident.
202
  Velleius concludes: “Epicurus has 
delivered us from these terrors.  Now that we are liberated, we have no fear of the 
gods, for we realize that they neither create trouble for themselves, nor seek to impose 
it on another.  We venerate with devoted reverence their pre-eminent and outstanding 
nature.”
203
  Cotta is quick to offer a critique. 
It is not immediately apparent why Cotta begins by declaring the existence of 
the gods to be the crucial issue.
 204
  Cicero himself had singled out providence in his 
Preface.  Further, Cotta is all but silent on Velleius’ arguments against providence in 
book one;
205
 instead, he chooses to focus on Epicurus’ alleged clandestine atheism in 
order to dismiss his views on the gods altogether.
206
  This difficulty is resolved when 
we consider that Cotta is speaking with an Epicurean, a supposed natural philosopher, 
rather than a Stoic or citizen.  The principal issue for the natural philosopher is 
whether the gods exist at all; for the citizen, whether they are providential, rewarding 
or punishing human conduct. 
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Cotta chides Velleius: “So are you, the natural philosopher who with gimlet 
eye hunts down the secrets of nature, not ashamed to look for evidence of the truth in 
minds steeped in familiar convention?”
207
  This is to say: is Velleius not ashamed to 
accept such arguments ex consenu gentium that the gods only assume human form, let 
alone exist at all?  No doubt, Cotta teases, Jupiter always sports a beard while Apollo 
is clean shaven; or that their names truly are Jupiter and Apollo.
208
  Why assume the 
form of the gods human?  Do we not have reports of crocodiles, ibises, and cats being 
worshipped by the Egyptians?  To be sure, as a man, nothing seems more beautiful to 
you than other human beings.  But as a natural philosopher, can you not see how a 
mare must appear to a stallion, or how any beast on land or sea does not delight in its 
own species?
209
  Cotta continues: 
 
[W]as anyone ever so blind in his survey of realities as not to see that these 
human shapes have been ascribed to the gods for one of two possible reasons?  
Either some strategy of the philosophers sought to divert more easily the 
minds of the unsophisticated from debased living towards observance of the 
gods; or superstition ensured that statues were furnished for men to worship in 
the belief that they were addressing the gods themselves.  Poets, printers, 
sculptors have nurtured these attitudes, because it was not easy to preserve the 
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 Both reasons given by Cotta are essentially the same: whether fashioned 
deliberately or not by philosophers’ prose, poets’ verse, or sculptors’ chisels, man 
more easily accepts providential gods in human guise.  But come now, says Cotta, 
while some epigoni of Epicurus may actually believe such tripe, what did Epicurus 
himself believe?  Did he not give merely nominal assent to the gods’ existence while 
dispensing with them in reality to avoid incurring the Athenians’ displeasure?
211
  
How else can one explain his ridiculous doctrine of quasi-body and quasi-blood?  Did 
not Velleius himself just now state that according to Epicurus all things are the 
chance corporeal combinations of atoms and must with time decay?
212
 
 Velleius himself does not dare deny the gods’ existence.
213
  A senator, he 
seems to be more citizen than natural philosopher.  Cotta therefore separates Velleius 
from his master and accuses Epicurus directly of clandestine atheism.
214
  Beliefs like 
the existence of the gods are often popularly, if only publicly, held in order to avoid 
indictment.  Cotta cites the example of Protagoras of Abdora who opened his book on 
the nature of the gods with the words, “I cannot say whether the gods exist or not,” 
and by order of the Athenians was banished from Athens and had his books publicly 
burnt.
215
  “I personally think that this precedent induced many more reluctant to 
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 Cf. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers 9.51-2.  Hereafter cited as 
Diogenes Laertius.  The first line of Protagoras’ treatise On the Gods has been 
preserved by Diogenes Laertius (9.51): “As to the gods, I have no means of knowing 
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declare similar convictions, for mere expressions of doubt could not guarantee them 
immunity from punishment.”
216
  One need only mention in passing the similar 




  The first book 
ends with Cotta siding with the Stoic Posidonius in dismissing Epicurus as one who 
did not grapple seriously with the problem of the gods.  He could not have been such 
an idiot as to fashion the gods in human form and along such muddled lines as quasi-
body and quasi-blood.
219
  Epicurus did not believe in the gods at all; his teachings on 







                                                                                                                                           
either that they exist or that they do not exist.  For many are the obstacles that impede 
knowledge, both the obscurity of the question and the shortness of human life.”  Plato 
in his Theaetetus (151e) attributes to him the statement: “Man is the measure of all 
things, of things that are that they are, and of things that are not that they are not.”  As 
Walsh, The "ature of the Gods, p. 147 n.2 remarks, such a statement excludes any 
appeal to divine revelation about the gods’ existence. 
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 Diogenes Laertius 2.6-15; Plutarch, Life of Pericles 16-32 and Life of "icias 23. 
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 Plato, Apology of Socrates; Xenophon, Apology of Socrates to the Jury.  Of 
course, unlike Protagoras or Anaxagoras who fled Athens to avoid indictment, 
Socrates stood trial and paid the ultimate penalty. 
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 Cf. Mayor, “On the Design and Execution of the Dialogue,” p. ix. 
 
220
 "D 1.123.  Cf. 3.3.  Also cf. Strauss, “Notes on Lucretius,” p. 134: “Yet if we 
consider the crucial importance of the Epicurean gods in the Epicurean presentation 
of the truth, are we not driven to say that in the decisive respect Epicurus too is a 
poet?  Do the Epicurean gods not magnify or embellish the whole?” 
 




Throughout De "atura Deorum there exists a tension between Cotta the philosopher 
and Cotta the priest; between Cotta’s conflicting acceptance of the demands of 
philosophy on the one hand and revelation on the other; between Cotta’s seeming 
agreement with Lucretius the Epicurean and with Balbus the Stoic.  Whether Cicero 
the author was actually a Stoic remains to be seen; Cicero the character cast his vote 
in favor of Stoicism and thus providence. 
Cotta’s silence on Velleius’ attack on providence in book one is taken up and 
expanded upon in book three in response to Balbus’ Stoic presentation of the gods in 
book two.  Balbus had divided his argument into four sections: the gods’ existence, 
the nature of the divine, providential governance of the universe, and the world 
ordered for man’s benefit.
221
  These four divisions are essentially two, the gods’ 
existence and their providential nature.  Cotta critiques them accordingly.
222
  More 
revealing than the arguments themselves are the concerns underlying them.  Like 
Lucretius, Cotta seems to adhere strictly to the demands of philosophical reasoning.  
When beginning his critique of the divine nature, Cotta notes the important 
distinction between what one can see for oneself as opposed to what is simply 
received from others.
223
  He will continually ask Balbus, not for rumor or hearsay, but 
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 "D 3.10-19, 3.20-64, 3.65 (the section on providential government of the universe 
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223
 "D 3.20.  Cf. Strauss, "atural Right and History, pp. 86-9. 
 




  Like Lucretius, he will seek human rather than superhuman 
explanations for phenomena.  For example, when speaking on why many 
communities endowed brave citizens, now deceased, with divine status, he gives a 
political reason: “There are many communities in which the memory of brave men 
has clearly been hallowed by endowing them with the status of immortal gods.  The 
purpose of this was to promote valour, so that the best citizens would be more willing 
to confront danger on behalf of the state.”
225
  Like Lucretius, Cotta attributes the 
workings of the universe not to the gods, but nature.
226
  When a natural explanation is 
not forthcoming, he notes men like Balbus are quick to ascribe them to the divine: 
“All such [workings of the universe] require an explanation, but you Stoics in your 
inability to provide one hasten to seek sanctuary with God.”
227
  And like Lucretius, 
Cotta makes a distinction between what the many are capable of believing and the 
truth the philosopher is supposed to seek.
228
  It is no accident that these and other 
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“Sceptics in Cicero and Hume,” p. 102-3. 
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And yet like Janus, Cotta has an entirely different face he presents to the 
world which adheres strictly to the demands of revelation.  Cotta continually takes 
pains to draw attention to his role as priest and his acceptance of ancestral 
authority.
230
  How can these two conflicting positions be reconciled?  Here it is 
helpful to turn once more to Cicero’s own admonishment in his Preface.  There 
Cicero had stated that the crucial issue concerning the gods was providence.  The 
emphasis on providence was owed to its political importance.  If the activities 
touching upon religious obligation owed by man for divine supervision are mere 
façade and pretence, they can contain no true devotion; if they contain no true 
devotion, then all sense of the holy and of religious obligation is destroyed.  If this 
were to occur, political society, he maintained, would be thrown into great confusion 
and the preeminent virtue of justice would disappear.  This caution is continually 
repeated by Cotta.
231
  For example, before discussing whether the gods reward virtue 
and punish vice, the backbone of the doctrine of providence, Cotta cautions: 
 
I broach this topic with reluctance, since my discourse seems to lend authority 
to misbehaviour.  That would be a justifiable assumption, if without recourse 
                                                 
230
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to any appeal to heaven our very awareness of virtue and of vices did not 
carry such considerable weight.  Once that awareness is removed, the whole 
moral edifice collapses.  Just as a household or a state appears to be ordered 
without a sense of reason and discipline, if rewards are not offered for just 
behaviour and punishments for misdemeanours, so there is certainly no divine 
governance in the universe, in so far as it is directed towards men, if no 






Cotta the character and Cicero the author both begin from the perspective of 
the citizen in the interests of healthy political life.  It would not do to write a dialogue 
in which the state religion or the divine as such is outright attacked—not only for the 
author’s own safety, but in the interests of persuading the leading citizens that doing 
one’s duty to the state is divinely sanctioned.
233
  If Epicurus had taught that the good 
is the same as the pleasant and the pleasant entirely corporeal—with no superhuman 
arbiter—Cicero recognized the politically ruinous implications.
234
  If one were to 
begin to think of political society as a social contract in which patriotism is based on 
calculations of foregoing pleasure if it is likely to bring greater pain, and fleeing pain 
if it promises greater pleasure, what causes a citizen to obey the laws unobserved—to 
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 Cf. "D 1.111, 115-18. 
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say nothing of giving the ultimate sacrifice on the battlefield?
235
  In short, if there was 
much of Zeno in Cato, there was just as much of Epicurus in Caesar.
236
 
The solution to this political problem lies in the dialogue form.  The dialogue 
allows the philosopher, “to conceal one’s own private opinion, to relieve others from 
error and in every disputation to look for the most probable solution.”
237
  The 
dialogue allows conflicting positions to be presented and their presentation to be 
directed, but the philosopher’s own views remain concealed.  The burden of ultimate 
conclusions is placed on the reader.  The reader therefore must be sensitive to the 
dramatic details of the dialogue, the place, time, actions, and speeches of the 
characters.  Less than sensitive readers will gleam partial but salutary truths; the more 
serious, more comprehensive if problematic truths.
238
  In De "atura Deorum one may 
find many of these telling dramatic details.  Cicero was very aware that to the 
Romans philosophical speculation was in itself a rather undignified if not suspicious 
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  It thus had to be presented in a suitably respectable Roman setting.  
Therefore we find, as in so many of Cicero’s dialogues, the time and setting of De 
"atura Deorum to be during a holiday when public business was suspended.
240
  Only 
during holidays after the performance of civic responsibilities did the Romans permit 
such leisure time.
241
  But it was not enough to have the right setting; Cicero also 
needed the right people to participate in the dialogue.  The auctoritas of the Romans 
selected must be great, their character fitting for the role.  Thus in De "atura Deorum 
Cicero chose three very respectable Roman men to present the three schools of 
thought.  It is most likely for this reason that Gaius Velleius, a senator, was chosen to 
represent the Epicurean school rather than Lucretius, a poet.
242
  Further, Cicero 
decided against casting the dialogue in contemporary times with himself as the 
principal speaker for fear of the personal risks he would take in treating sensitive 
public issues with this own voice.  Instead he decided to set the dialogue in the 
historical past between 77 and 75 BC and give himself an all but mute role.
243
  When 
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he does speak, it is either to distance himself from his own school or declare partiality 
for the Stoic and thus providential account.
244
  Finally, Cicero is able to make the 
unpleasant Academic skepticism palatable to the Romans by enlisting the aid of the 
priest Gaius Aurelius Cotta: 
 
Paradoxical as the resulting dichotomy may seem, the introduction of a pontiff 
to play the main Academic role in Cicero’s stead represents a brilliant and 
bold attempt to obtain for the negative criticism of the dogmatic theologies the 
objectivity necessary to satisfy the Roman audience that their own traditional 
religion was not being undermined; for the figure of Cotta through his high 





 When we consider the function of the dialogue as used by Cicero generally 
and in De "atura Deorum specifically, the arguments of Cotta the philosopher 
impress us as being closer to those of Cicero the author than those of Cotta the 
priest.
246
  After all, Cicero himself in his Preface had urged the reader, “to look to the 
weight of reason rather than authority,” and when reviewing the arguments on the 
nature of the gods, “to pass judgement on which of their views is true.”
 247
  Cicero 
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thus seems to have been sympathetic to much of Lucretius’ teaching on religion and 
providence.  What then separates him from Lucretius—why was he not an Epicurean 




Cotta had accused Epicurus at the end of book one of utterly undermining religious 
observance, overturning the temples and altars of the immortal gods, not by violence, 
as Xerxes had done,
248
 but by the force of his arguments.  Why should men worship 
the gods when the gods show no regard for them let alone take no responsibility or 




Piety means giving the gods their due; but what religious law can we follow, 
when humans and gods have no common bond?  Religious observance is 
expertise in divine worship, but I fail to understand why the gods should be 





Why revere the gods when we see in them no outstanding qualities?  The 
Epicureans believe they banish superstition when they expunge men of religious fear; 
in fact, they banish the religious observation embraced by devoted worship.
251
  If 
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providence is linked to religious observation and religious observation to salutary 
political life, Cotta’s next rebuke becomes clear:  “Then again, some have said that 
belief in immortal gods was a total invention by the sages in the interests of the state, 
so that those who could not be impelled by reason should be constrained by religious 
awe to a sense of duty; surely they too have utterly undermined all religion?”
252
 
Cotta gives two images of political man.  There is the man who obeys the laws 
“impelled by reason” to a sense of political duty.  This reason itself is something of a 
religious one in which he believes “humans and gods have a common bond.”  The 
Stoics and most honest citizens are such men.  Then there is the man who cannot be 
compelled by reason and must be “constrained by religious awe to a sense of duty.”  
Such a wicked man would otherwise act in the interests of his own pleasure when 
positive law fails.  In either case, religious observation is necessary for healthy 
political life.  Epicurus and his disciples fail to recognize this because they dismiss all 
political activity as conventional.  Lucretius may have been the most profound of the 
Epicureans and therefore the conventionalists, but he ultimately sided with the 
Garden.  In refusing to allow the gods to accord help and favor to men, providence, 
he, like his master Epicurus, “wholly uprooted religion from human hearts”.
253
  “For 
if we explain and rationalize these rituals, we gain more knowledge of natural 
philosophy than of gods.”
254
  So, too, do we understand even less of political man.  
There is a link between piety and healthy political society.  But to truly understand 
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this link, we must turn from Cicero’s De "atura Deorum to his De Legibus.  There 
we also find two images of political man, but in the form of two different foundations 
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Conventionalism holds all political activity to be artificial, entirely determined by 
man and thus able to be dismissed by man. The most developed form of classical 
conventionalism is Epicureanism and the most comprehensive account of 
Epicureanism is Lucretius’ De Rerum "atura.  In that account there may be observed 
a tension between Epicurus’ reduction of all human existence to corporeal pleasure 
and pain, and Lucretius’ own persistent suspicion of a theological-political nature 
peculiar to man.  This reasonable suspicion reveals the seams in the argument from 
convention.  The alternatives are the arguments from revelation and nature.  
Lucretius’ contemporary Cicero and his De "atura Deorum provide a thoughtful 
account of the argument from nature.  In that account it is observed that man as he 
now exists is necessarily, not willfully, political, and that his political nature requires 
the argument from revelation for salutary political life.  While this political nature 
was suspected by Lucretius, it was ultimately rejected in favor of the perspective of 
the natural philosopher.  Cicero and those who sympathize with him begin with it in 
favor of the perspective of the citizen.  But while De "atura Deorum was primarily 
intended as a bridge between the arguments of revelation and nature, Cicero’s De 
Legibus or On the Laws is principally concerned with political life.  The latter is a 
descent from the former. 
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Divided into three extant books,
255
 the first book of De Legibus offers a 
substantial setting and proem, and two accounts of two possible foundations of law, 
the latter account concluding with an encomium in praise of philosophy.
256
  The 
second book begins with another substantial proem, resumes the discussion of the 
first foundation of law, and concludes with a discussion of religious law constituted 
on that first foundation.
257
  The second account is silently forgotten.  The third book 
establishes magisterial law, again, based on the first account.
258
  The relevance of the 
two proems to the larger discussion of the law is not initial clear; however, 
understanding them proves crucial to a complete account of law and thus political 
society.  This difficulty can only be removed at the end of the chapter after both 
accounts have been examined.  Like De "atura Deorum, De Legibus is written as a 
dialogue and takes place on a holiday; unlike De "atura Deorum, it is acted out rather 
than recounted, has no dramatic date and offers no preface.  Further, being first and 
foremost a political dialogue, De Legibus rarely ascends to the abstract discussion 
found in De "atura Deorum.  The entire dialogue takes place, literally and 
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figuratively, in the shade.
259
  This setting consciously imitates Plato’s own Laws.
260
  
The reader of De Legibus, like the reader of Plato’s Laws, must be aware that the 
discussion of the laws is less an investigation of what is true or ideal and more what is 
appropriate or possible. 
The conversation on the nature of law and the best civil laws takes place on 
Cicero’s family estate in Arpinum over a long summer’s day.  A mature Cicero is 
joined by his younger brother, Quintus Tullius Cicero
261
 and lifelong friend, Titus 
Pomponius Atticus.
262
   While out walking one morning the trio comes across a grove 
and an oak which Atticus perceives to be the famous oak of Arpinum mentioned by 
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Cicero in his epic poem, Marius.
263
  The tree is quite old and if the famous original 
still survives, Atticus remarks, this is surely it.  Quintus, a poet, responds: “It 
survives, Atticus, and it will always survive: its roots are in the imagination.  No 
farmer’s cultivation can preserve a tree as long as one sown in a poet’s verse.”
264
  
Atticus asks Quintus what he means.  Do you really believe, Quintus replies, the olive 
tree they show today on the Acropolis in Athens to be the original; or the palm shown 
in Delos actually the same tree Homer’s Ulysses said he saw there?
265
  For many are 
the things which last longer in recollection than they do in nature.
266
  Atticus does not 
disagree with Quintus, but says that his question was intended for the author of the 
Marius himself.  Did Cicero’s verses plant this oak or did he base his poem on some 
other account?
267
  Atticus does not seriously consider whether there may have ever 
been a true account or a real oak of Marius.  Cicero responds by asking Atticus in turn 
whether he believes it true that Romulus took a stroll after his death and told Proculus 
Iulius that he was a god named Quirinus and ordered a temple to be dedicated to him 
on that spot; or that in Athens the North Wind picked up Orithyia?  For that is what 
“they say.”
268
  Atticus does not understand—why does he ask?  Cicero answers: 
“Only that you should not be too particular in your researches into things that are 
                                                 
263
 The Marius is believed to have been written in the 50s.  It is now lost. 
 
264
 Leg. 1.1 
 
265
 Cf. Odyssey 6.162. 
 
266
 Leg. 1.2. 
 
267





  82 
 
handed down in stories of this kind.”
269
  But people who read the Marius wish to 
know the truth about the events related, Atticus retorts.  Not that I would want to be 
called a liar, replies Cicero, but people behave ignorantly (imperite) when they look 
for truth in a poet.  No doubt such people think Numa had conversations with Egeria 
or an eagle placed the priest’s cap on Tarquin’s head.
270
 
The examples of Numa and Tarquin strike Quintus as being more akin to 
history than poetry.  Surely Cicero draws a distinction between the two?
271
  Cicero 
replies that in the case of poetry, everything aims at pleasure, in history, truth—
although there are countless fables in Herodotus the father of history and in 
Theopompus.
272
  Quintus’ introduction of history gives Atticus the opportunity for 
which he has been waiting.  He requests that Cicero write a proper Roman history.  
Prior attempts by Romans have been dry, rustic, or plain ignorant, especially the early 
writers.
273
  It would seem the answer to Quintus’ question is that the distinction 
between poetry and history is often blurred.
274
  After all, much of what is reported 
concerns events which occurred long ago and are handed down by those who did not 
see them.  Both Herodotus the father of history and the early Roman writers were as 
much poets as they were historians.  In the case of the early Roman writers, Atticus 
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notes that they were outright ignorant.  Does this mean that the present Romans are 
ignorant about early Roman history and thus their ancestral ways, customs, and laws?  
How much of Roman law is fabulous? 
Cicero is unwilling to accept Atticus’ request.  He only has snatches of free 
time.  A history requires a good deal of free time arranged in advance and cannot be 
finished quickly.
275
  Atticus suggests Cicero obtain an ambassadorial appointment or 
some other such post which offers freedom and leisure.  Cicero muses that he would 
not be adverse to following ancestral custom and accepting the privilege which comes 
with old age, sitting in a counselor’s seat and giving legal advice to clients.  Not only 
would he be able to fulfill Atticus’ request, but even devote himself to larger and 
richer subjects.
276
  Atticus the Epicurean and philosopher dislikes the idea of Cicero 
sitting in court; far from freeing Cicero from duty, service to the courts would merely 
increase it.  Quintus the Stoic and citizen approves of it.
277
  Thus the proem to the 
first book of De Legibus begins with a discussion of poetry, leads to a question on the 
distinction between poetry and history, and finally in turn broaches the main topic of 
law.  There is a link between these three which we are not yet in a position to 
examine. 
Since this is one of those snatches of time, asks Atticus, why not speak on the 
subject of civil law?  After all, Cicero studied law from the time he was a young with 
Quintus Mucius Scaevola and seemed rather devoted to it.  Atticus summons Cicero 
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to a long discussion, but since they have free time, Cicero is willing to undertake it.  
Quintus, too, is willing.
 278
  The trio decides to walk along the shady bank of the Liris 
while Cicero explains his ideas on the civil law.  However, Cicero is unwilling to 
speak on mundane legal matters such as the function of jurists, laws regarding water 
running off roofs, shared walls, and so forth.  To be sure, such legal matters have their 
place and there is no shortage of eminent men who write on them.
279
  But for Cicero, 
the civil law is a small and narrow part of the larger nature of law.
280
  Atticus requests 
that since Cicero has written elsewhere about the best form of the commonwealth, 




Cicero: Then is this your wish?  Just as with the Cretan Clinias and the 
Lacedaemonian Megillus, as [Plato] describes it, he spent a summer day in the 
cypress groves and forest paths of Cnossos, frequently stopping and 
occasionally resting, discoursing on public institutions and the best laws, in 
the same way let us walk and rest among these tall poplars on this green and 
shady bank and inquire into these same subjects more deeply than is required 
by the practical uses of the courts. 
 
Atticus: That is exactly what I want to hear. 
 
Cicero: What about Quintus? 
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 The proem to the first book ends with the agreement of the trio to engage in a 
discussion of the nature of the law and the best civil laws with Cicero as the principal 




The first account of law begins with a concession.  Cicero defines law as the highest 
reason, rooted in nature which commands what must be done and prohibits the 
opposite.  Law is therefore a judgment about right and wrong conduct, a distinction 
between justice and injustice.  To speak on law is to speak on justice, specifically, the 
highest law or justice which existed before there were any states.  Thus Cicero turns 
to the beginning and source of justice in nature.
283
  Atticus remarks that he is willing 
to accept a discussion on law in which law is sought for in nature; for “with nature’s 
leadership there will be no possibility of getting lost.”
284
  However, Cicero interjects: 
 
Cicero: Then, Atticus, will you grant me this (I know Quintus’ opinion), that 
all nature is ruled by the force or nature or reason or power or mind or will—
or whatever other word there is that will indicate more plainly what I mean—
of the immortal gods?  If you don’t accept this, then I will have to make it the 
starting point of my case. 
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Atticus: Of course I will grant it, if you wish; the singing of the birds and the 
noise of the river give me reason not to fear that any of my fellow students 





 Nature’s leadership could very well mean nature as understood by the 
Epicureans, as atoms, void, and accident.  By obtaining Atticus’ concession, the 
foundation for the first account of law and justice is grounded on nature as understood 
by the Stoics, as providentially ordered by the gods.
286
  Nor is this concession out of 
keeping with Atticus’ stance as an Epicurean.  Atticus is willing to grant Cicero’s 
request for three reasons: first, it was Atticus who had requested Cicero speak on law 
as Plato had done before him;
287
 second, Cicero is his friend and it is gratifying to 
please one’s friends;
288
 and third, he is obviously enjoying himself and his 
surroundings.
289
  Atticus grants Cicero’s request because it is pleasant for him to do 
so; his concession remains in accordance with Epicureanism. 
 The first account of law is a divine one.  In De "atura Deorum, Cotta had 
observed that piety meant giving the gods their due, but had questioned what was due 
to inactive and idle gods who cared nothing for man, let alone had no common bond 
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  In De Legibus, a strictly political dialogue, we are told there is indeed 
such a bond.  Here Cicero presents a teleological cosmology.  Law (lex) is said to be 
the highest reason (ratio summa) of the cosmos.  This highest law is itself traced back 
to the immortal gods who rule nature.  The immortal gods have established a 
community of reason between man and god.  Through reason, specifically, the right 
use of reason (recta ratio), man may know the highest law or justice.  It is this highest 
reason which commands and prohibits human conduct regardless of the particular 
state one lives in.
.291
  Nor is everything said to be perishable or accidental.  The gods 
gave to man the divine gift of a soul.  Though the body is mortal and will eventually 
perish, the soul is divine and will last for eternity.  It is the soul which forms the bond 
between man and god and allows for man’s use of reason.  And it is the soul which 
allows for man, alone among the animals, to perceive god; for all nations no matter 
how savage acknowledge the gods.  We remember in De "atura Deorum that Cotta 
had argued against such a proof ex consensu gentium.
292
 
So it is that in the first account the foundation or reason for law is providential 
gods who single out man for the greatest possible gift, the soul, which not only allows 
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for the use of reason and thus justice, but even grants man immortality.  So it is that 
the gods’ providential favor extends to the world as created and ordered for man’s 
benefit.
293
  And so it is that man is “born for justice” owing to the common bond 
between man and god.
294







The second account of law begins with an accusation.  It seems to Atticus that Cicero 
has lost his own freedom of speech in his presentation of law thus far; or perhaps 
Cicero is the sort of man who follows the authority of another rather than his own 
judgment?
296
  Cicero replies: 
 
Not always, Titus, but you see the direction of this discussion.  My whole 
discourse aims at making commonwealths sound, establishing justice, and 
making all peoples healthy.  For that reason I am afraid of making the mistake 
of starting from first principles that are not well considered and carefully 
examined; not that everyone should agree with them—that is impossible—but 
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so that they will have the approval of those who believe that all right and 
honorable things are desirable in their own account, and that either nothing at 
all should be considered good unless it is praiseworthy in itself or at least that 






 The first account of law is intended to strengthen commonwealths, establish 
justice, and make peoples healthy by seeking the approval of the sort of man 
introduced in De "atura Deorum who obeys the laws “impelled by reason” to a sense 
of political duty.
298
  This man may be persuaded by the reasonable argument from 
revelation that there is a common bond between man and god, reason, which the gods 
gave to man along with his soul, allowing for the use of right reason and therefore 
justice.
 299
  Since justice so understood is divine, just actions may be considered 
desirable in themselves.  Stoics and most honest citizens—of whom Quintus is one—
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  But what of the second sort, the wicked man who cannot be 
compelled by the reasonable argument that justice is praiseworthy in itself and instead 
must be, “constrained by religious awe to a sense of duty?”
301
 
 Immediately after drawing Atticus’ attention to the aim of the discourse in the 
first account, Cicero proceeds to banish the Epicureans, Atticus’ school, and silence 
the skeptical Academics, Cicero’s own school.  Those, he says, who indulge 
themselves and are enslaved to their bodies, who judge everything to be sought or 
avoided by pleasure and pain—even if what they say is true, and this is not the place 
to discuss it—they must be ordered to talk in their gardens and stand away from the 
bonds of civil society, “of which they know nothing and have never wished to know 
anything.”
302
  In keeping with Cotta’s stance in De "atura Deorum, Cicero’s 
rejection and banishment of Epicureanism as a political philosophy does not 
necessarily mean he rejects it as a natural philosophy.   What is inappropriate is not 
necessarily untrue.
303
  As for the skeptical Academy which confuses all these 
questions, Cicero requests that its adherents remain silent.  For if they attack these 
things which he has so neatly arranged and composed in the first account of law, they 
will cause excessive damage.  However, unlike the Epicureans, not only does Cicero 
                                                 
300
 Cf. Leg. 1.38.  Cf. also West, “Cicero’s Teaching on Natural Law,” p. 75: 
“[Quintus] is possessed by a certain excess of the love of one’s own that typifies the 
citizen and gentleman at all times and places.” 
 
301
 "D 1.118. 
 
302
 Leg. 1.39. 
 
303
 Cf. Leg. 1.39 with Or. 3.64.  Cf. also Nicgorski, “Cicero and the Epicurean 
Temptation,” p. 16. 
 
  91 
 
request rather than order the Academy’s silence, but even seeks to conciliate them, 
that is, persuade them of the worth of his political teaching.
304
  To do this he 
introduces a second foundation or reason for law. 
 The second account of law is a human one.  Unlike the first account in which 
law was said to originate from the common bond between man and god, here it is said 
to be a phenomenon of the conscience which in itself is not a sufficient deterrent to 
the wicked man.  Nor added to it are positivistic penalties.  “If penalties and the fear 
of punishment rather than criminal behavior itself are the deterrent from an unjust and 
criminal existence, then no one is unjust, and the wicked should rather be considered 
incautious.”
305
  Those who are not moved by the idea of honor as such to be good 
men, but rather by some sort of utility or profit, are not good but crafty.  What would 
such a man do in the dark if he is afraid only of witnesses and judges?  What would 
he do in some deserted place if he should encounter someone weak and alone from 
whom he could steal much money?
306
  Such a wicked man must be overawed by the 
fear of otherworldly penalties. 
But perhaps someone might object that while there is no law by nature, there 
is law by convention.  What then?  Is not the most stupid thing of all, says Cicero, to 
declare just whatever has been ratified by a people’s institutions or laws?  What about 
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the law of tyrants, be they one, few, or many?
307
  Further, does not this understanding 
of law simply reinforce the idea of obedience out of utility or profit?  Is justice 
established on the basis of utility not uprooted by that same utility? 
 
[I]f justice is obedience to the written laws and institutions of a people, and if 
(as these same people say)
308
 everything is to be measured by utility, then 
whoever thinks that it will be advantageous to him will neglect the laws and 
will break them if he can.  The result is that there is a no justice at all if it is 
not by nature, and the justice set up on a basis of utility is uprooted by that 
same utility: if nature will not confirm justice, all virtues will be eliminated.  
Where will be a place for liberality, for love of country, for piety, for the 
desire to do well by others or return kindness?  These all arise because we are 





 In sum, in the first account of law we were told that the foundation for justice 
was the common bond between man and god, in the second, that it is man’s own 
natural affection;
310
 previously that law is the highest reason, now, that it is a 
phenomenon of human conscience;
311
 before that man is born for justice, here, that he 
is born for civil society.
312
  The foundation or reason for law in the first account rests 
on providential gods, the second, on human nature alone.  Both accounts demonstrate 
                                                 
307
 Leg. 1.42.  Cf. Leg. 1.44-7. 
 
308
 I.e., the Epicureans. 
 
309
 Leg. 1.42-3.  Cf. Leg. 1.48-52; Fin. 49-50. 
 
310
 Cf. Leg. 1.23 with 1.43. 
 
311
 Cf. Leg. 1.18 with 1.40. 
 
312
 Cf. Leg. 1.28 with 1.62.  Also cf. Benardete, “Cicero’s De Legibus I,” p. 303. 
 
  93 
 
that man’s political nature requires the argument from revelation for salutary political 
life. 
The second account of law is the only ascent in De Legibus and it is quickly 
terminated by Quintus.  If Cicero and Atticus were permitted, they would continue on 
to discuss the supreme good, by which all things may be judged.
313
  Quintus is quite 
satisfied with the first account of law and is persuaded that the good has been 
sufficiently brought to light.  He is impatient to discuss the civil law and so declares 
the question of the highest good to be irrelevant in the present discourse.
314
  Cicero 
ironically remarks that Quintus speaks “most prudently.”  He yields to his brother and 
concludes the second account of law, but not before giving an encomium to what they 
briefly ascended, nor would again return to in the remainder of the dialogue, 
philosophy.
315
  In the second book Quintus will request that the trio, “sit in the shade 
and return to that part of the discussion from which we digressed.”  Cicero will begin 
his account of law for a third and final time, “From Jupiter the beginning of songs,” 
since, “now we too must take the starting point of the discussion from Jupiter and the 
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other immortal gods.”  Quintus declares it right to do so and replaces Atticus as the 
primary interlocutor.
316




We are now in a position to examine the proems to books one and two and thus glean 
Cicero’s complete teaching on law.
317
  Again, it is not immediately apparent what 
relevance either has in a dialogue on law.  The proem to book two begins with Atticus 
suggesting that since Cicero must begin his speech again and they have walked 
enough that they sit down and continue their conversation on the island in the 
Fibrenus.  Atticus is enthralled by the beauty of the place and with Cicero’s family 
estate in general.
318
  Cicero remarks that he too seeks out the beauty and restfulness of 
the place whenever possible—but adds that he has another cause for pleasure in 
coming here.  Arpinum is his and his brother’s true fatherland.  Here one may find 
Cicero’s family rituals and the traces of his ancestors; here one may enter the house 
of his father and grandfather; here one may see the place where Cicero was born and 
raised.  “And so something abides deep in my mind and feelings which makes me 
take all the more pleasure in this place, just as the wisest of men is said to have 
                                                 
316
 Leg. 2.7. 
 
317
 Leg. 1.1-16 and 2.1-7 resp. 
 
318
 Leg. 2.1-2. 
 
  95 
 
refused immortality so that he could see Ithaca again.”
319
  Arpinum, says Cicero, is so 
to speak his “cradle.”
320
 
 Atticus does not understand Cicero’s comment that Arpinum is his “true 
fatherland.”  What of Rome?  Indeed, says Cicero, all those born in municipia or 
municipalities have two fatherlands, one given by nature, the other by citizenship.  
Cicero is Tusculan by nature and Roman by convention. 
 
But of necessity that one takes precedence in our affections whose name 
‘commonwealth’ belongs to the entire citizen body, on behalf of which we 
have an obligation to die, to which we should give ourselves entirely and in 
which we should place and almost consecrate everything we have.  But in our 
affections the one that bore us stands almost as high as the one which received 
us; and so I will never deny that this is my fatherland, while recognizing that 





 The idea Cicero wishes to convey with respect to the Roman municipia is very 
much in keeping with what Tocqueville would later teach regarding the New England 
towns in America.  In both the Roman municipia and the New England towns a 
citizen had a deep vested interest; both were the most immediate extension from the 
family of the love of one’s own.  It is here where the vast majority of men concentrate 
their interest and ambition.
322
  From the municipium or town, by degree, the citizen 
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may extend his interest to the greater multitude of his fellow peers.  Eventually, this 
vested extension may even prompt him to love his country at the expense of his 
immediate relations.  The seeds of justice are first and foremost planted in the love of 
one’s own family and town.  This attachment is natural; its extension to the larger 
citizenry and state, while higher in precedence, is nonetheless conventional.
323
  To 
best promote good laws, citizens must be inculcated with them while young within 
their “true fatherland”, the fatherland by nature.  Thus the second proem introduces 
the crucial relationship between the love of one’s own and law.  Such law seeded 
early on in this most immediate of soils forms the mores and customs of a people, the 
unwritten law.  And it is this unwritten law which legislates best. 
 We will remember that the proem to book one begins with a discussion of 
poetry, leads to a question on the distinction between poetry and history, and finally 
in turn broaches the main topic of law.  The dialogue began with Atticus coming 
across an old tree which he takes to be the fabulous tree of Marius should it should 
still survive.  Quintus the poet remarked that it would always survive, for its roots are 
in the imagination.  No farmer’s cultivation can preserve a tree as long as one sown in 
a poet’s verse.  When Atticus presses Cicero for the truth of the story, Cicero replies 
that only fools seek truth in a poet.  The discussion of poetry introduces the topic of 
history and raises the question as to whether there is a distinction between the two.  
The implicit answer was that the distinction between poetry and history is often 
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blurred.  After all, much of what is reported concerns events which occurred long ago 
and are handed down by those who did not see them.  Both Herodotus the father of 
history and the early Roman writers were as much poets as they were historians.  In 
the case of the early Roman writers, Atticus had noted that they were outright 
ignorant.  Their histories are quite suspect.  We are therefore left to wonder whether 
the present Romans are not equally ignorant about early Roman history and thus their 
ancestral ways, customs, and laws.  Law first appears in the dialogue as something 
handed down by unreliable sources from a time long ago which may or may not be 
entirely fabulous.   Thus the first proem introduces the relationship between poetry 
and law.  The unwritten higher law of mores and customs which determine mundane 
legal matters such as the function of jurists, laws regarding water running off roofs, 
shared walls, and so forth has much of its origins in poetry.
324
 
 When considered together, the proems in books one and two offer Cicero’s 
complete teaching on the law.  Law is part poetry and part love of one’s own.  The 
relationship between poetry and law answers how the law originates; the love of 
one’s own and law, why it is obeyed.  Initially law does indeed appear to be simply 
conventional, determined by man and thus able to be dismissed by man.  But when 
we consider that man requires law, be he the honest man of the first account of law or 
the wicked man of the second, law emerges as something natural, not artificial.
325
  
The conventionalist argues that law is made, the naturalist that law is grown; the first 
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is a conscious act, the second an unconscious inheritance; the former implies that law 
is mere artifice or contrivance, brought into being out of utility and thus able to be 
changed or dismissed by that same utility, the latter implies that law is natural, born 
into and cultivated, readily accepted from birth and thus fundamentally changed only 
with great difficulty.
326
  Cicero’s complete teaching on law demonstrates not only that 
political man naturally requires the law, but how it naturally originates and why it is 
naturally obeyed.  It demonstrates that political society, far from being artificial, is 
quite natural.  Obedience to law, however, especially fundamental law, requires piety.  
A healthy political society is one in which its citizens show dutiful respect to the 
source of the higher law in which justice originates.  If a citizenry loses its piety, it 
risks becoming corrupt.  Justice constituted solely on the basis of utility is 
undermined by that same utility.  Better law may make for better citizens, but piety is 
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Justice is argued by the conventionalist to be artificial rather than natural and thus 
those who practice it to be fools.  If justice were natural rather than conventional it 
would be manifestly known to all men, at all times, everywhere.  But in point of fact 
notions of justice change, not only from society to society, but even in the same 
society from age to age.  It is the product of human society.  Moreover, justice is not 
desired for its own sake, but always in the interest or utility of some one or few.  
There is no common good.  Laws are observed because of punishments, not justice.  
Man seeks society not out of affection, but calculation.  It was weakness which 
caused individuals living in solitude to seek their own self-preservation in the first 
communities; weakness which made political society possible; weakness which is the 
mother of justice.  And since justice is conventional rather than natural it is only wise 
to seem just, but practice injustice.  All successful individuals and nations have acted 
in this manner.  Those who practice justice too strictly risk weakening their own 
power.  No one may reasonably be expected to follow a course which may lead to 
their impoverishment or destruction.  The individual or nation must therefore appear 
just while practicing injustice.  All the benefits stemming from the appearance of 
justice will be had while all the misfortunes from too strictly practicing it will be 
avoided.  To appear just but practice injustice—that is human nature.  Man always 
acts out of considerations of utility. 
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If justice is truly arbitrary and the best regime truly a fiction then it is then 
quite reasonable to constitute a society which aims at man’s true end, pleasure, while 
securing it by means of his true bearing, passion.  This reorientation of political 
society by utility was achieved in modernity.  But was it warranted?  As we have 
observed, such an argument depends on all human need being reduced to the 
corporeal pleasure of individuals living in solitude.  Epicurus had argued that all the 
objects of man’s attachment are valuable, not in themselves, but only insofar as they 
serve to produce bodily well-being.  Those pleasures called spiritual are not 
essentially different.  The wise man is more inclined towards happiness, not because 
wisdom itself is worth pursuing, but because wisdom better ensures pleasure and 
wards off pain.  Such a use of reason in no way changes the nature of pleasure; it 
simply ensures its continuation.  Epicurus’ understanding of happiness contradicts 
many of his discipline Lucretius’ most important findings about the nature of man.  
Throughout Lucretius’ poem we observed a tension between Epicurus’ corporeal 
reductionism and Lucretius’ own grudging admission that there might be needs, still 
more fundamental, exclusive to men living in political society.  Lucretius’ discussion 
of religion and the nature of political man suggest two such needs, first, the 
alleviation of a fundamental fear that the eternal is not lovable, nor the lovable 
eternal, and, second, the belief in providential gods who reward virtue and punish 
vice in deterring unjust conduct.  The reader of Lucretius’ De Rerum "atura was left 
with the persistent suspicion that man is most pleased when he is secure, not simply 
in bodily well-being, but in the comfort of providence and justice.  Thus we parted 
ways with Lucretius.  His rejection of this theological-political problem seemed to 
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ignore his own most important findings regarding religion and the nature of political 
man. 
If Lucretius had suspected that providence weighed heavily on man; Cicero 
was more certain of it.  If Lucretius had tentatively recognized its political 
implications; Cicero began with them.  And if Lucretius had reluctantly incorporated 
the needs of the citizen into his work on natural philosophy; Cicero’s philosophical 
works start from the perspective of the citizen and surface only indirectly to natural 
philosophy.  Thus to better understand those needs of man which have nothing to do 
with his body, it was helpful to turn from Lucretius to his Roman contemporary, 
Cicero.  Cicero, too, had recognized that the crucial issue concerning the gods is 
providence.  The reason for providence’s importance, according to Cicero, was 
similar to that given by Lucretius.  The emphasis on providence was owed to its 
political importance.  If the activities touching upon religious obligation owed by man 
for divine supervision are mere façade and pretence, they can contain no true 
devotion; if they contain no true devotion, then all sense of the holy and of religious 
obligation is destroyed.  If this were to occur, political society, he maintained, would 
be thrown into great confusion and the preeminent virtue of justice would disappear.  
This caution caused Cicero to approach political society from the perspective of the 
citizen.  The perspective of the citizen warrants something other than a scientific 
treatise; it merits the dialogue form.  The dialogue allows conflicting positions to be 
presented and their presentation to be directed, but the philosopher’s own views 
remain concealed.  The burden of ultimate conclusions is placed on the reader.  The 
reader therefore must be sensitive to the dramatic details of the dialogue, the place, 
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time, actions, and speeches of the characters.  Less than sensitive readers will gleam 
partial, but salutary truths; the more serious, more comprehensive if problematic 
truths.  And yet when we read De "atura Deorum closely, we observe that Cicero 
was not unsympathetic of much of Lucretius’ teaching on religion and providence.  
The question then became what separated him from Lucretius—why was he not an 
Epicurean but rather a tireless opponent of Epicureanism?  Cicero presented two 
images of man in De "atura Deorum.  There is the man who obeys the laws 
“impelled by reason” to a sense of political duty.  This reason itself is something of a 
religious one in which he believes, “humans and gods have a common bond.”  The 
Stoics and most honest citizens are such men.  Then there is the man who cannot be 
compelled by reason and must be, “constrained by religious awe to a sense of duty.”  
Such a wicked man would otherwise act in the interests of his own pleasure when 
positive law fails.  In either case, religious observation is necessary for healthy 
political life.  Epicurus and his disciplines failed to recognize this because they 
dismissed all political activity as conventional.  If one approaches man’s rituals and 
conventions simply from the perspective of natural philosophy, it stands to reason 
that one gains more knowledge of natural philosophy than political philosophy.  The 
Epicureans were so intent on examining providence as natural philosophers that they 
missed the crucial fact that regardless of the existence of providence—political man 
demands providence.  This suggests a link between piety and healthy political society.  
To more clearly understand this link, it was helpful to turn from Cicero’s De "atura 
Deorum to his De Legibus.  There we also found two images of political man, but in 
the form of two different foundations and reasons for law. 
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Cicero’s De Legibus takes place, literally and figuratively, in the shade, rarely 
ascending to the abstract discussion found in De "atura Deorum  The purported aim 
of the dialogue is, first, to discuss the foundation or reason for law, and, second, to 
prescribe good civil laws given that foundation or reason.  However, there are 
actually two accounts and thus two foundations given.  Only one foundation is 
ultimately continued with past the first book; civil laws are prescribed based on it in 
the second and third while the other account is silently forgotten.  Finally, the first 
two books feature substantial proems on matters whose relevance to law is initially 
unclear but whose understanding ultimately proves crucial to a complete account of 
law and thus political society.
 
 The first account of law is a divine one.  In De "atura 
Deorum, Cotta had observed that piety meant giving the gods their due, but had 
questioned what was due to inactive and idle gods who cared nothing for man let 
alone had no common bond with him.  In De Legibus, a strictly political dialogue, we 
are told there is indeed such a bond.  The gods gave to man the divine gift of a soul.  
It is the soul which forms the bond between man and god and allows for man’s use of 
reason.  The right use of this reason reveals justice.  Thus in the first account the 
foundation or reason for law is providential gods who single out man for the greatest 
possible gift, the soul, which allows for the use of reason and therefore justice.  After 
Atticus’ accusation that Cicero seemed to have lost his own freedom of speech in this 
presentation of law, we are told the purpose of the account.  The first account of law 
was intended to strengthen commonwealths, establish justice, and make peoples 
healthy by seeking the approval of the sort of man introduced in De "atura Deorum 
who obeys the laws “impelled by reason” to a sense of political duty.  This man may 
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be persuaded by the reasonable argument from revelation that since justice is divine, 
just actions may be considered desirable in themselves.  But what of the second sort, 
the wicked man who cannot be compelled by the reasonable argument that justice is 
praiseworthy in itself and instead must be, “constrained by religious awe to a sense of 
duty?”  Cicero thus embarked on a second reason or foundation for law.  The second 
account is a human one.  If in the first account of law we were told that the 
foundation for justice was the common bond between man and god, in the second, 
that it is man’s own natural affection; if previously that law is the highest reason, 
now, that it is a phenomenon of human conscience; if before that man is born for 
justice, here, that he is born for civil society.  The foundation or reason for law in the 
first account rests on providential gods, the second, on human nature alone.  But this 
natural affection and conscience is in itself not a sufficient deterrent to the wicked 
man.  Nor added to them are positivistic penalties.  The wicked man must be 
overawed by a fear of otherworldly penalties.  Both accounts demonstrated that man’s 
political nature requires the argument from revelation for salutary political life.  But 
to demonstrate that man needs law is not the same thing as demonstrating what law is.  
To understand Cicero’s complete teaching on law, we turned to his two seemingly out 
of place, but ultimately telling proems in books one and two.  There we observed that 
law is part poetry and part love of one’s own.  The relationship between poetry and 
law answers how the law originates; the love of one’s own and law, why it is obeyed.  
The complete teaching on law demonstrates not only that political man naturally 
requires the law, but how it naturally originates and why it is naturally obeyed.  It 
demonstrates that political society, far from being artificial, is quite natural.  
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Obedience to law, however, especially fundamental law, requires piety.  A healthy 
political society is one in which its citizens show dutiful respect to the source of the 
higher law in which justice originates.  If a citizenry loses its piety, it risks becoming 
corrupt.  Justice constituted solely on the basis of utility is undermined by that same 
utility.  Thus Cicero concludes that while better law may make for better citizens, 
piety is required if the law is to be obeyed.  No more revealing evidence for Cicero’s 
argument may be found than in the histories of Tacitus.  Writing two centuries after 
Cicero, Tacitus, observing this very corruption in the late Roman Empire, poignantly 
wrote: corruptissima re publica plurimae leges—“the laws are most numerous when 






Cicero’s analysis of the problem of conventionalism did not originate ex nihilo, but as 
he admits is inherited from the philosophical legacy of Aristotle and, especially, 
Plato.
328
  This is not to say he does not remain his own man— that would be to repeat 
the misconception that Cicero was a mere translator of others’ ideas.
329
  This is 
explicitly denied by Cicero himself in the second book of De Legibus, after what he 
calls his proem to the law and before his discussion of religious law: 
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Marcus: . . . .  This is the proem to the law, to use Plato’s term. 
 
Quintus:  Yes indeed, brother, and I am particularly pleased that you 
concentrate on subjects and ideas different from his.  There is nothing so 
unlike Plato as what you said earlier, or as this preface concerning the gods.  
The only thing you seem to me to imitate is this style. 
 
Marcus:  Perhaps I wish to; but who can or ever will be able to imitate him?  
It’s easy enough to translate his ideas, and I would do that if I didn’t prefer to 
be myself.  What is the difficulty in translating the same things in virtually the 
same words? 
 






At any rate, to better understand Cicero’s analysis of the deficiencies of 
conventionalism, it remains in this conclusion to discuss his relationship to Aristotle 
and Plato.  In approaching this question, worthy of a book itself, I focus on Cicero’s 
use of Aristotle and Plato in De "atura Deorum and De Legibus specifically while 
considering the larger Ciceronian corpus more generally.  As Cicero was far more 
influenced by Plato than Aristotle, I begin with the latter. 
 “Aristotle far excels all others—the exception always being Plato—in both 
genius and diligence,” writes Cicero in the first book of his Tusculanae 
Disputationes.
331
  Along with Plato, Cicero believed Aristotle represented all that is 
best in philosophy; merely translating their “divine talents” would have been a 
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patriotic service to Rome.
332
  Cicero even went so far as to name the two gymnasia in 
his Tusculan villa the Academy and Lyceum.
333
  Aristotle’s primary importance for 
Cicero seems to have been rhetorical.  This is meant in two ways, first, in the actual 
technical practice of rhetoric, and, second, in the consistent creation of an artificial 
dichotomy throughout his dialogues for philosophical ends.  To begin with the first, 
none of Aristotle’s dialogues have survived, but as mentioned in the second chapter, 
it is believed that Cicero wrote dialogues in the manner of Aristotle in which the 
speeches of the other interlocutors were introduced in such a way that the principal 
part rested with the author himself, a device found throughout Cicero’s dialogues.  
However, the evidence for this assertion is contentious and, so far as I know, largely 
based off a single letter of Cicero’s.
334
  It is further speculated that Cicero was 
influenced by what he believed Aristotle’s great rhetorical innovation: elaborate and 
abundant speeches made on either side of an issue (utrumque partem dicere).  By 
such a rhetorical method of arguing on both sides, Cicero believed, one may best 
uncover the most probable truth.  But this, too, is a contentious claim, for the most 
part because while Cicero consistently singles out Aristotle for introducing this 
manner of arguing,
335
 scholars have had difficulty locating exactly where in the 
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Aristotelian corpus Cicero could have formed this opinion.  Some point to Aristotle’s 
lost dialogues; others to strained interpretations of Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Topics.
 336
 
It is striking that Cicero omits Aristotle and his Peripatetic school from the 
discussion in De "atura Deorum.  In the opening of the dialogue, Cotta explicitly 
states that if Marcus Piso were present, they would have representatives of all the 
reputable schools.  But no need to regret his absence, says Cotta, for the Stoics and 
Peripatetics differ merely in words, not substance.
337
  This claim that the Stoics and 
Peripatetics were substantively no different is repeated in other dialogues.
338
  
However, the differences between Stoic and Aristotelian theology are striking: 
 
The god or gods of Metaphysics 12 are immaterial, whereas the Stoic gods are 
material beings.  The god of Metaphysics 12 is transcendent, in Stoicism god 
is immanent in every smallest part of the universe.  God does not directly care 
about the good order of the cosmos in Metaphysics 12, nor for human beings, 
whereas God’s providence is his most prominent characteristic in Stoicism, 
especially as presented by Balbus in De natura deorum 2.  The cosmos has no 
divinely caused beginning in Aristotle, and of course no final consumption by 
fire.  One could go on listing items like this, but we have already enough to 
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As Aristotle’s popular dialogues have been entirely lost, I do not consider here 
the possibility that Cicero’s judgment may have originated from them.  Apart from a 
single Aristotelian dialogue mentioned in De "atura Deorum, On Philosophy,
340
 
there is simply too little evidence from which to judge.  One might very well then 
accuse Cicero of ignorance of the difference between Aristotelian and Stoic theology.  
But in truth Cicero well understood the important theological distinctions listed above 
and outlined them in his Academica—written before De "atura Deorum.
341
  Thus it is 
not on account of ignorance that Cicero classified Aristotle with the Stoics in De 
"atura Deorum.  What then is to be gained from doing so? 
 
. . . Cicero omitted a Peripatetic spokesman from his team of theologians, not 
because he was ignorant, nor because he thought it unimportant, nor for 
reasons of literary elegance, nor by chance.   His reason was that he thought of 
theology as intimately connected with cosmology, and in cosmology he 
thought of two opposed sides: Epicureanism on the one hand, and an amalgam 
of Aristotle and the Stoics on the other.  It was enough to expound these two 
positive theologies, and allow each of them to be criticized by the school that 






 This is precisely what we have seen as Cicero’s primary objective in De 
"atura Deorum.  In a dialogue in which he identifies providence as the key issue, it 
makes very good sense to create a dichotomy, albeit an artificial one, between 
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Epicureanism and Stoicism, chaos and providence, chance and purpose.  This allows 
Cicero to highlight the contrast between the perspective of the natural philosopher 
and that of the citizen.  Inclusion of a nuanced account of the Peripatetic school 
would have only muddled the issue.  Thus Cumming noted: “[Cicero’s] arrivals at 
solutions to political problems regularly take the philosophical form of reconciling 
other oppositions between philosophical positions by anchoring them all to their 
common opposition to Epicureanism.”
 343
  This same dichotomy may also be found 
for similar reasons in De Legibus.  There the Peripatetic school is also stated to differ 
from the Stoic merely in words, not substance.  However, in De Legibus the 
dichotomy allows Cicero to enlist the Peripatetics, along with the Academy and Stoa, 






The exception for Cicero is always Plato, “our Plato,”
345
 “the first philosopher in 
rank,”
346
 “that god of ours,”
347
 “a philosopher’s god.”
348
  Plato is cited by Cicero 
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more than any other author; the sheer number of references is nothing short of 
staggering.
349
  He translated Plato’s Protagoras and Timaeus into Latin, the latter 
immediately before writing De "atura Deorum.
350
  This intimate familiarity with the 
Timaeus is apparent in De "atura Deorum, in particular in the presentation of the 
doctrine of providence and immortality of the soul ridiculed by Velleius and praised 
by Balbus.
351
  In De Legibus, Cicero would follow in Plato’s footsteps, sharing with 
him the belief in the power of persuasion,
352
 the need for the sanctity of oaths and 
treatises,
353
 and the refusal to allow the gods to be propitiated by the wicked.
354
  One 
may carry Cicero’s admiration for Plato almost to the point of declaring that he 
desired to become a Roman Plato, as when he himself went so far as to cite Plato’s 
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In addition to Aristotle, Cicero consciously imitated Plato’s dialogue form,
356
 
titled his own political works De Re Publica and De Legibus after Plato’s Republic 
and Laws, and even borrowed directly from Plato’s scene-setting.
357
  The most 
notable examples of this latter imitation may be found in Cicero’s three most 
ostensibly political works, De Oratore, De Re Publica, and De Legibus.  The setting 
of De Oratore has the interlocutors follow the suggestion of Scaevola who requests a 
discussion on rhetoric and the ideal orator after the example of Socrates in the 
Phaedrus.  “For your plane tree (platanus) here suggests this to me, by spreading its 
broad boughs to shade this place exactly like that other plane tree whose shade 
Socrates sought—which seems to me to have grown not so much because of the little 
stream described there as owing to Plato’s words.”
358
  In both the Phaedrus and De 
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Oratore, the interlocutors sit under plane trees, that is, Plato trees.
359
  But rather than 
throw themselves on the grass with their bare feet, as Socrates did, the interlocutors in 
De Oratore call for cushions and sit on the stone benches under the plane tree.
360
  
Such comfort and civility is Cicero’s way of calling attention to the fact that he is a 
philosophical late-comer; philosophy, new and young at the time of Socrates, is now 
old and well-traveled in late Republican Rome.
361
  As mentioned in the third chapter, 
the discussion in De Legibus takes place, literarily and figuratively, in the shade 
throughout the entire dialogue.  Being a summer’s day, the interlocutors walk and talk 
under the shady trees along the bank of the Liris,
362
 rest under them on an island in 
the Fibrenus,
363
 and, eventually, when the midday sun’s rays pierce the island’s 
young trees, continue down the Liris to pursue the rest of the conversation under the 
shade of the alders.
364




Just as with the Cretan Clinias and the Lacedaemonian Megillus, as [Plato] 
describes it, he spent a summer day in the cypress groves and forest paths of 
Cnossos, frequently stopping and occasionally resting, discoursing on public 
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institutions and the best laws, in the same way let us walk and rest among 
these tall poplars on the green and shady bank and inquire into these same 





The reason for the similar setting in both Plato’s Laws and Cicero’s De 
Legibus, as we have observed in the third chapter, is owed to the nature of the 
discussion.  The topic is the law, a subject which necessarily involves the early 
history, ancestral ways, and customs handed down by unreliable sources from a time 
long ago which may or may not be entirely fabulous.  The setting opposite to De 
Legibus, again both literarily and figuratively, may be found in De Re Publica.  There 
the discussion takes place in winter and the interlocutors sit under the sun in an open 
field for warmth and illumination.
367
  The setting in De Re Publica is also owed to the 
nature of the discussion.  The topic is the best regime.  It is pursued in a speculative 
manner which, with the exception of the brief ascent in the second account of law, is 
certainly not to be found in De Legibus.  This is again in conscious imitation of 
Plato’s Republic in which, as Cicero himself points out, Plato, “created a state more 
to be desired than expected; one as small as possible, not one that could exist, but one 
in which the principles of civic organization could be discerned.”
368
  Finally, while 
De Legibus begins with the topic of poetry, a fabulous art, and through it eventually 
broaches the subject of law and thus political society,
369
 De Re Publica begins with 
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the topic of astronomy, a natural science, and eventually turns to the subject of the 
best regime and thus the best political society.
370
  In short, following Plato, Cicero’s 
De Legibus takes place in the darkness of convention; De Re Publica, the light of 
philosophy. 
Cicero further draws a revealing distinction between Plato and Socrates.  This 
is not immediately apparent.  In the majority of Cicero’s works, mention made of 
Socrates, Cicero’s Socrates, is the same as Plato’s Socrates.  He will often refer to the 
philosophical position of “Socrates and Plato,” or himself as a “follower of Socrates 
and Plato,” or contrast the united two against other philosophers.
371
  Or he will 
maintain that Plato shared Socrates’ skepticism, a position Cicero himself 
embraced.
372
  Or he will point out that Plato’s Socrates was not the historical 
Socrates, but largely a character of Plato’s creation.  And it is this modified Socrates 
which Cicero pairs with Plato and with whom he is in substantial agreement.
373
  The 
distinction Cicero made between the historical Socrates and the Platonic was between 
the former’s more rigid turn to moral and political philosophy, contrasted with the 
latter’s embrace of knowledge as such, as represented by Plato’s own Pythagorean 
pursuits.  After the death of Socrates, Plato chose to leave Athens, something Socrates 
was always loath to do, in order to seek further wisdom from the Pythagoreans living 
in Egypt, Italy, and Sicily.  Cicero knew the historical Socrates repudiated such 
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 Plato attributed them to him in order to magnify and beautify him.
375
  
Neither Plato’s enlarged philosophical pursuits nor is his embellishment of Socrates 
disparaged by Cicero.
376
  Nicgorski comments: 
 
It appears, in fact, that Plato’s journeys can be taken as an openness to the full 
sun or the sunniest of perspectives and hence can be taken to represent 
philosophy in its fullness; one might wonder whether the limiting Socratic 
questions are seen by Cicero to set a horizon to philosophy with which 





Cicero saw Socrates as the founder of all philosophy as it was known in 
Cicero’s time.
378
  All schools contemporary with Cicero traced their lineages back to 
him, Academics, Peripatetics, Stoics, even Epicureans.  It was specifically Socrates’ 
turn to matters of life and character which separated him from all prior philosophers 
and which marked him as the source of all subsequent philosophy.
379
  But while 
Socrates was for Cicero the founder of philosophy, Plato, not Socrates, was its 
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 Tusc. 2.8, 4.5-6, 5.119-20; Off. 3.61-2.  Cf. Nicgorski, “Cicero’s Socrates,” pp. 
219-20. 
 




  This much said in reply to Cicero’s detractors who argue he was not 
open to the “full sun” of philosophy. 
A final word on Cicero’s philosophical affiliation with Plato.  Cicero 
consistently describes himself as an Academic skeptic, a position which, as discussed 
in the introduction and second chapter, considered absolute knowledge unobtainable; 
what can be known is what is more or less probable.  Arguments are advanced on 
both sides of an issue in order to uncover the most likely answer.
381
  Cicero associated 
this Academic skepticism with the position taken by Plato himself.
382
  However, it 
must be stressed that this Academic skepticism was not Pyrrhonism.  Academic 
skepticism did not debar one from accepting verisimilitude or highly probably 
arguments.  Writing in the context of whether he ought to follow Pompey into the 
newly formed First Triumvirate with Caesar and Crassus, Cicero commented: “I 
come now to the month of January, and my political position; I shall argue on both 
sides in the fashion of the Socratics, but in the end, as they do, come down on one.”
383
  
Cicero similarly comes down on what he believes the most probable argument in his 
philosophical works.  However, as we have observed in the second and third chapters, 
his own opinion of the probable truth is rarely what is explicitly stated, as when the 
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character Cicero decides in favor of the Stoic account of the gods in De "atura 
Deorum or the first account of law in De Legibus, but rather is revealed, not only in 
each dialogue as a whole, but in the larger Ciceronian corpus.  Consider that Cicero’s 
introduction of the two types of political men, the honest man “impelled by reason” 
and the wicked man “constrained by religious awe” in De "atura Deorum had to be 
understood in light of the two accounts of law in De Legibus.  Many more such 
examples could be given.  The two settings of De Re Publica and De Legibus alert 
careful readers that those dialogues are to be taken as two halves of a whole political 
teaching.  The Stoic remedy for the fear of death and other ills in Tusculanae 
Disputationes must be considered in light of the crushing objections to Stoicism in 
books three and four of De Finibus, the latter written immediately before the former.  
The affirmation of traditional Roman religious rites and denial of the gods’ existence 
in De "atura Deorum must be contrasted with the affirmation of the gods’ existence, 
but denial of traditional Roman religious rites in De Divinatione, the latter written 
immediately after in supplement to the former.
384
  Such use of the dialogue form in 
requiring readers to reconcile not only conflicting positions within the same dialogue, 
but across several dialogues was very in keeping with Plato, as Cicero knew well.
385
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 For the contrast between De "atura Deorum and De Divinatione, cf. Momigliano, 
“The Theological Efforts of the Roman Upper Classes,” p. 209: “The De natura 
deorum had paid lip service to the traditional values of Roman religious tradition, 
including auspicia, but had been a rigorous denial of the possibility of the gods.  In 
De divinatione the game was inverted: lip service was paid to religion, but any forms 




 Cf. Or. 2.313; Orator 50; Tusc. 5.11.  Cf. also esp. Tusc. 5.32-3 where Cicero has 
an interlocutor explicitly draw attention to his inconsistency across his dialogues.  
Cicero replies: “Take that way with other people who are handicapped in argument 
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It cannot be denied that Cicero was a political man who believed active 
political participation essential;
386
 but nor can it be denied that he was a philosopher 
who, like Plato, believed philosophy essential to the best life.
387
  No more fitting 
word on this final point may be given to conclude this dissertation than that given by 
Cicero himself.  It will be remembered that at the end of the first book of De Legibus, 
Quintus, impatient to discuss the civil law, objects to any further discussion de finibus 
bonorum et malorum.  Cicero yields to his brother and concludes the second account 
of law, but not before giving a poetic encomium to what they briefly ascended, nor 
would again return to in the remainder of the dialogue, philosophy: 
 
But as things are, since law ought to correct vices and encourage virtues, then 
knowledge of how to live should be drawn from it.  Thus it is the case that 
wisdom is the mother of all good things, from the love of which philosophy 
took its name in Greek.  The gods have given to human existence nothing 
richer, nothing more outstanding, nothing more noble.  Philosophy alone has 
taught us, in addition to everything else, the most difficult of all things, that 
we should know ourselves; and the force and significance of this maxim are 
such that is was attributed  not to some human but to the god of Delphi.  The 
person who knows himself will first recognize that he has something divine 
and will think that his own reason within himself is a sort of consecrated 
image of the divine.  He will always do and think things worthy of this great 
gift of the gods; and when he has studied and made a complete examination of 
himself, he will understand how he came into life fitted out by nature, and 
what tools is has for getting and possessing wisdom, since in the beginning he 
formed the first sketchy conceptions of all things in his mind; and when light 
has been cast on them under the guidance of wisdom he recognizes that he is a 
good man and for that reason he perceives that he will be blessed.  For when 
the mind, through the knowledge and perception of virtue, has departed from 
obedience to and indulgence of the body, and has conquered pleasure like 
                                                                                                                                           
by rules: I live from day to day; I say anything that strikes my mind as probable; and 
so I alone am free.” 
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some blot of disgrace, and has escaped all fear of death and pain, and has 
entered the bond of affection with his own—and has recognized as his own all 
those who are linked with him by nature—and has taken up the  worship of 
the gods and pure religion, and has sharpened the gaze of his mind, like that of 
the eyes, for the selection of good things and the rejection of the opposite, the 
virtue which is called “prudence” from the capacity to see ahead,--what can be 
said or thought to be more blessed than he?  And when he has studied the 
heaven, lands, seas, and the nature of things, and has seen where they come 
from and where they are going and when and how they will perish, what in 
them is mortal and bound to die, what is divine and eternal; and when he has 
(so to speak) got a grip on the god who guides and rules these things and has 
recognized that he is not bound by human walls as a citizen of one particular 
spot but a citizen of the whole world as if it were a single city—then in this 
perception and understanding of nature, by the immortal gods, how he will 
know himself, as Pythian Apollo commands, how he will scorn and despise 
and think as nothing all which are commonly called magnificent!   And he 
will fortify all these things as if by a fence through the method of argument, 
the knowledge of judging true and false, the science of understanding logical 
consequences and contradictions.  And when he realizes that he is born for 
civil society, he will realize that he must use not just that refined type of 
argument but also a more expansive style of speaking, through which to guide 
peoples, to establish laws, to chastise the wicked and protect the good, to 
praise famous men and to issue instructions for safety and glory suited to 
persuading his fellow citizens, to exhort people to honor, to call them back 
from crime, to be able to comfort the afflicted, to enshrine in eternal 
memorials the deeds and opinions of brave and wise men together with the 
disgraces of the wicked.  And of all these great and numerous things which 
are recognized as present in man by those who wish to know themselves, the 
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